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Very few developments have ever transformed either tort or insurance
law. One development—as important in our time as the adoption of liability
for negligence was in the 19th century or the rise of strict products liability
was in the 20th century—transformed both. That is the rise of long-tail civil
liability. A long-tail claim involves tortious or other liability-creating
conduct that causes latent bodily injury or property damage that then
manifests itself only many years after the harm-causing conduct occurred.
Exposure to asbestos, and the storage of hazardous waste that slowly leaches
into an aquifer, are paradigm examples. Beginning about fifty years ago,
long-tail liability and claims against liability insurers for insurance coverage
of long-tail liability have generated the vast majority of cutting-edge issues
facing these two related fields. It is precisely the length of the tail on certain
tort claims that is responsible for most of the fundamental developments in
these fields over the past fifty years. Without long-tail liability, tort and
insurance law, and many of the fundamental structural features of these
fields, would look today much like they looked fifty years ago, and indeed,
fifty years before that. But because of long-tail liability, features of both fields
that simply did not exist fifty years ago are now central to these fields.
Almost all of this involved common law change. In an era dominated
legally by federal legislation and the administrative state, the long-tail
liability revolution was the exceptional instance in which judge-made, statelaw rules governing tort law and insurance were central. The long-tail
liability revolution took decades to occur, largely because it occurred
through the common law process. It is also an example of what the legal
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system may face in the 21st century, if and when common law litigation over
injury and loss caused by many new technologies that are coming onto the
current scene begins to occur. This Article is an effort to understand how the
long-tail liability revolution occurred, by analyzing the influence of this new
form of liability on tort and insurance law, as well as the consequences that
these changes in the law have produced.
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INTRODUCTION
Very few developments have ever transformed either tort or insurance
law, although there is a handful of them. 1 One development, and only one,
has transformed both tort and insurance law. And that development has taken
place with little recognition that it has played a central role in these
transformations. This is the rise of long-tail civil liability.
A long-tail claim involves tortious or other liability-creating conduct
that causes latent bodily injury or property damage that then manifests itself
only many years, and sometimes decades, after the harm-causing conduct
occurred.2 Exposure to asbestos and the storage of hazardous waste that
slowly leaches into an aquifer are paradigm examples. Beginning about fifty
years ago, long-tail liability and claims against liability insurers for insurance

1

The major such developments are as follows. First, beginning around 1850, accident law
went from being a mix of strict liability and negligence liability to being based predominantly
on negligence. The seminal case on the issue is Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292
(1850). Second, between 1910 and 1920, the adoption of workers’ compensation removed
employers’ liability from tort and replaced it with an administrative compensation scheme.
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 52–57 (2008) (hereinafter THE LIABILITY CENTURY). Third, in
the mid-1960s, the rise of strict products liability took the negligence standard out of the
picture in this field, although (it turned out) not to the extent originally envisioned. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1997) (describing the
rationale for the strict liability standard); Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, 733–34 (1992)
(describing products liability developments); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 791–802 (1966) (recounting the
developments that led to the adoption of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A). Finally,
developments in the insurance markets led to the promulgation of a Comprehensive General
Liability (CGL) insurance policy in 1940, fully standardizing business liability insurance for
the first time. See THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra, at 155 (describing the 1940 CGL as “the
first modern business liability insurance policy”). It would be a struggle to find other
plausible examples of transformations of this magnitude in either field.
2
See THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 152–57 (defining the “long-tail” problem as
one that results from products and environmental torts causing “injury or damage that occurs
gradually, out of sight, and away from the defendant.”).
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coverage of long-tail liability have generated the vast majority of the cuttingedge issues facing these two related fields of law.3
It would be difficult to exaggerate the impact of the rise of long-tail
liability on the two fields. In tort, and in the allied field of environmental
liability, long-tail liability generated the very phenomenon of the mass tort;
produced statistically-based forms of settlement and the advent of the
“settlement fund” that served as a model for the September 11 and Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill funds; caused the courts to develop radical new doctrines
governing causation; and was the basis for the several hundred-billion dollar
Superfund regime of retroactive, strict, and joint and several corporate
liability for environmental cleanup costs.
At the same time, liability insurance for long-tail liability produced
an insurance “crisis” of such significance that it made the cover of Time
Magazine; an antitrust suit by nineteen states against the insurance industry,
alleging a conspiracy involving insurance of long-tail liability, went all the
way to the Supreme Court and yielded the seminal rule governing the
insurance industry’s cooperative preparation of standard-form insurance
policies; and the courts created not only a whole new body of insurance law
doctrines but also new concepts such as the “trigger” of coverage and the
“allocation” of coverage responsibility among multiple triggered policies.
The new insurance law doctrines came close to bankrupting Lloyd’s of
London and caused the introduction of two new forms of insurance coverage.
Nothing comparable to the number and magnitude of these
developments has ever influenced tort and insurance law in such far-reaching
ways. Yet, for all the analysis of individual developments in long-tail
liability4 and insurance coverage of such liability5 that has been produced
3

The one exception is the partial shift to strict liability for product defects that occurred
around 1965. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
4
Some of the major works on individual issues associated with long-tail liability in tort
include Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases,
68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Mark J.
Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984); Steven Shavell,
Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 19 J.L. & ECON. 587
(1985); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management
in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985); Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A
Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992); Heidi Li Feldman,
Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1995); Roger C.
Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and “Settlement Class Actions”: An
Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995); Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of
Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. 2 (2019).
5
Some of the major works on individual issues associated with long-tail liability insurance
include Robert D. Chesler, Michael L. Rodburg & Cornelius C. Smith, Jr., Patterns of
Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Coverage for Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18
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over the last several decades, there has been no effort to describe and assess
the overall character and influence of long-tail liability on the law of torts and
insurance, let alone the consequences of long-tail liability that extend far
beyond legal doctrine. In my view, separate subject-matter silos—especially
the stark divide between tort law and insurance law scholarship—have been
a major obstacle to seeing the long-tail liability phenomenon as a whole.6
This Article is an effort to bridge that divide and to engage in a combined
analysis of many seemingly disparate developments in tort and insurance that
are in fact closely related.
These developments were able to occur only because of the
confluence of a number of factors. The industrial activity of the first half of
the 20th century, along with the chemical and pharmaceutical revolutions of
mid-century,7 generated bodily injury, disease, and pollution-related property
damage that involved long-latent harm. This led to long-tail liability, and to
claims for insurance coverage of that liability. But long-tail liability would
have been non-existent or stunted if science and medicine in the second half
of the 20th century had not become capable, at least some of the time, of
identifying the causes of that harm. These advances made litigation over
liability feasible, for without scientific and medical evidence of causation,
many, perhaps most, suits alleging long-tail liability would never have been
brought. Ironically, then, both the causes of the harms at issue in long-tail
liability actions, and the legal system’s capacity to address them, were
grounded in the technological and scientific advances of the time.
Yet all this took place in an institutional context heavily influenced
and constrained by judicial federalism. The rise of the “administrative state,”
RUTGERS L.J. 9 (1986); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause
Through the Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237 (1986); Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental
Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942 (1988); Jordan S. Stanzler &
Charles A. Yuen, Coverage for Environmental Cleanup Costs: History of the Word
“Damages” in the Standard Form Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 1990 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 449; Michael G. Doherty, Comment, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability
Among Successive Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257 (1997); Kenneth S. Abraham,
The Maze of Mega-Coverage Litigation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2102 (1997) [hereinafter
Abraham, Mega-Coverage Litigation]; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage
Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance After Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CONN. INS.
L.J. 349 (2006); Tom Baker, Insuring Liability Risks, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.
128 (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the “Absolute”
Exclusion in Context and in Accord with Its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT &
INS. L.J. 1 (1998); Christopher C. French, The “Non-Cumulation Clause”: An “Other
Insurance” Clause by Another Name, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 375 (2011).
6
For discussion of this scholarly divide, see THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 6–7.
7
See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SHAPING THE INDUSTRIAL CENTURY: THE
REMARKABLE STORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN CHEMICAL AND
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES (2005) (documenting developments in high-technology
industries from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century).
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and the centralization of regulatory authority in administrative agencies,
mostly at the federal level, has been recognized in legal scholarship and
public discourse for decades.8 Significantly, however, the fields of tort and
insurance law are almost entirely matters of state law, and of state common
law at that. Neither federal legislation nor regulation stepped in to deal with
long-tail harm or long-tail liability. They left the common law to deal with
these problems.
The long-tail liability revolution is therefore a significant example of
the way that the common law, operating inside the administrative state but
outside of any actual administrative regulation, dealt with a new, major,
system-wide challenge. The decentralized common law system developed
ways of coping with long-tail injury, disease, and property damage. But a
major aspect of the developments chronicled here is that it took a long time—
half a century, really—for the common law to cope with these developments.
This was partly a function of the complexity of the many issues that long-tail
tort and insurance coverage litigation generated. Judicial decisions made
issue-by-issue and case-by-case do not produce a fully-formed body of
doctrine in a mere year or two. But the time it took all of this to develop was
also a function of the fact that the sources of legal authority were a large
number of separate and independent state courts, as well as federal courts
applying state law. The bottom-up character of that kind of common law
development, and the cross-state harmonization that was required for
coherence eventually to evolve, inevitably meant that the process would take
decades to reach maturity.
This Article is an effort to understand how all this occurred by
analyzing the influence of long-tail liability on tort law and insurance law and
the consequences that these changes in the law have produced. The Article
argues that it is precisely the length of the tail on certain tort claims that is
responsible for so many of the fundamental developments in these fields over
the past fifty years. Without long-tail liability, tort and insurance law, and
many of the fundamental structural features of these fields, would look today
much like they looked fifty years ago, and indeed, fifty years before that. But
8

See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 574 (1984) (describing the structure and
increasing power of federal administrative agencies); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 408–09 (1989) (detailing the demand for
administrative agencies through the New Deal and social movements of the twentieth
century); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001)
(recounting the history of presidential control over administrative agencies); J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, Assessing the Administrative State, 32 J.L. & POL. 239, 243 (2017) (describing
the complex regulatory landscape of administrative institutions); Gillian E. Metzger, The
Supreme Court, 2016 Term – Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (pointing to the Obama-era expansion of the regulatory
state as the immediate trigger for the anti-regulatory actions of the Trump presidency).
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because of long-tail liability, features of both fields that simply did not exist
fifty years ago are now central to these fields.
Part I begins the analysis by recounting the rise of long-tail liability,
and by examining the three characteristic and challenging features of longtail liability: the sheer scale of the cases that results from the massive numbers
of claimants that are often involved; the economically high stakes for both
the claimants as a group and for the defendant; and the tendency of long-tail
claims to pose vexing issues of causation, largely because of the length of
time between the occurrence of tortious conduct and the manifestation of
injury or damage allegedly resulting from that conduct. The rise of this form
of liability produced changes in the way that tort litigation is handled and
causation is proved. It also led to the enactment of the federal Superfund
environmental cleanup program.
Next, Part II describes the revolution in insurance law generated by
claims for coverage of long-tail liability. This revolution involved protracted
litigation over the development of new doctrines governing coverage
responsibility among dozens or even hundreds of liability insurers that issued
liability insurance policies potentially covering a particular long-tail liability,
as well as the highly divisive controversy over insurance against liability for
environmental pollution that figured in this litigation.
Finally, Part III identifies a series of significant consequences of these
events that are now structural features of tort law, insurance law, law practice
in these fields, and the insurance markets: the century-long expansion of tort
liability for accidental bodily injury and property damage experienced a sharp
deceleration; the first tort reform statutes of general application ever enacted
became law in nearly every state; Lloyd’s of London’s general liability
insurance operation nearly collapsed and had to be restructured; a new form
of liability insurance, the Bermuda policy, came into being; and major
corporations came to rely more heavily on self-insurance then they ever had
done before.
The long-tail liability revolution was a creature of the 20th century.
But 21st century technologies that produce new kinds of physical, economic,
or emotional harm – cyber-invasions of privacy, the coming use of gene
therapy in medicine, malfunctioning facial recognition software, collisions of
driverless cars,9 artificial intelligence, and accidents involving any number of
other now-manual functions that will become automated, for example – are
starting to or will generate civil litigation and be subject to insurance. The
lesson of decades of long-tail litigation is that the liability rules, and the
insurance mechanisms that may cushion against these new forms of potential
9

See Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer
Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 VA. L. REV. 127, 128
(2019) (providing an overview of legal questions raised by future use of automated vehicles).

Vol. 6:3]

The Long-Tail Liability Revolution

353

and actual liability, are not necessarily going to be adequate to meet the
challenges that the new technologies pose. Yet another major set of
transformations may therefore be in the offing.
That process is likely to take place at least partly, and perhaps largely,
through the same kind of common law development that characterized the
long-tail liability revolution. The administrative state is unlikely to be heavily
involved, if the past, and the current national political climate, are any guide.
The developments I will recount show that common law tort and insurance
transformations of major scope take decades to occur and may be fully visible
only in retrospect. If and when tort and insurance transformations involving
twenty-first century technologies proceed, we can therefore expect the
transformations to last a lifetime before they are completed.
Whatever the future brings, one thing is clear: the changes that longtail liability generated are now such regular features of the law and practice
in these fields that they may appear always to have been in place, and always
to have been influential. But in fact, the history of these fields over the last
half-century demonstrates that, in a very real sense, long-tail liability changed
everything. This Article tells the story of that change.
I. THE RISE OF LONG-TAIL LIABILITY
In the pre-long-tail world of liability for accidental bodily injury and
property damage, there was essentially one kind of tort claim. This involved
a sporadic accident that caused immediately discernable physical harm to an
individual or small number of individuals, or to their property. Even the
exceptions—explosions,10 fires,11 bursting dams,12 airplane crashes 13—were
exceptional only because they involved injury to more than just a few people.
They were abruptly-occurring mass disasters. In the case of these larger
accidents, the same legal doctrines and practices that would have applied and
been followed in a tort claim where only a single individual had been injured
still applied to each individual’s claim. Thus, the profile of all tort claims was
essentially the same. 14
10

See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 23 (1953) (involving the explosion of
fertilizer on a ship that killed 581 people).
11
See, e.g., Jacobs v. Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 103 A.2d
805, 805 (Conn. 1954) (involving a circus tent fire that killed 169 people).
12
See, e.g., GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER 3 (2d ed. 2008) (recounting
the litigation involving the collapse of a dam that killed 118 people).
13
See, e.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 497 F. Supp. 313, 315
(D.D.C. 1980) (involving the crash of a passenger airliner).
14
In conventional product liability, there is a minor version of the long tail. Some time always
passes between the sale of the product and the occurrence of injury. Whether a product defect
or something else caused the injury in question is sometimes more open to question than in
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A different form of claim began to arise, however, with harm caused
by non-durable products such as drugs, and other substances such as
chemicals and waste, that have the potential to cause disease or illness rather
than violent injury. Individuals exposed to these drugs or chemicals can
contract diseases without knowing it, sometimes without knowing it for a
considerable period of time. Similarly, below-ground property damage
caused by pollution can occur but go undiscovered for long periods after it
begins. When disease or property damage has been latent for a long period,
it may be difficult to prove what caused it and when it first occurred.
The first, comparatively contained, long-tail cases involving latent
disease of this sort appeared in the 1960s.15 Shortly thereafter, however, came
the most massive long-tail tort cases ever brought— asbestos cases.16
Exposure to asbestos may cause near-immediate lung injury, but such injury
typically does not manifest in recognizable symptoms for several decades.
The first asbestos plaintiffs had been exposed to this substance at least as
early as the 1930s.17 In the last five decades there have been more than

non-products cases. The longer the time between sale and the accident, the greater the
probability that one of these other factors, and not a defect, was responsible. And unlike
manufacturing defect cases, which tend to be highly sporadic and one-off, the same problem
can recur in case after case involving design or warning liability. Nonetheless, this kind of
causal uncertainty did not prompt, and seems never to have prompted, serious proposals for
modifying the rules governing proof of causation in cases involving durable products. This
is probably because the problem is always present in principle, but infrequently present in
practice. Whether a defect or something else caused an accident or injury is usually
susceptible to traditional methods of proof, including modern accident reconstruction
techniques. And when such proof is not available, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur often
enables the plaintiff’s case to go to the jury. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS.
LIAB. §§ 3, 115 (AM. L. INST. 1997) (providing the requirements for drawing an inference of
negligence under the res ipsa loquitor doctrine).
15
The earliest prominent example involved MER/29, an anti-cholesterol drug that was shown
to cause cataracts. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 834 (2d Cir.
1967) (describing the MER/29 suits and the issues they posed); Paul D. Rheingold, The
MER/29 Story—An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116,
116, 121–22 (1968) (describing the mass litigation of MER/29 cases in the 1960s). There
were about 1500 federal and state suits involving this drug filed in different jurisdictions. Id.
at 121. Plaintiffs’ counsel cooperated in a variety of ways prior to the trials that were held,
including on joint discovery, presaging the method in which much mass tort litigation would
proceed in ensuing decades. Id. at 121–22, 125, 127.
16
The earliest appellate decision involving the first wave of asbestos cases was Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. 493 F.2d 1076, 1081 (5th Cir. 1973). Suit in the case was filed
in 1969, and there was a jury verdict in 1971. Robert Q. Keith & Robert J. Robertson, Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation, TEX. STATE HIST. ASS’N: HANDBOOK OF TEX.,
https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/borel-v-fibreboard-paper-products-corporation
[https://perma.cc/KRR5-GLN5].
17
Borel, 493 F.2d at 1083–84.
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700,000 claims alleging bodily injury caused by exposure to asbestos. 18
Diagnosing asbestos-related lung disease (asbestosis), or a rare cancer variant
(mesothelioma) does not pose difficult problems of proof. But as we will see
below, issues of causation still often arise because many claimants have been
exposed to asbestos from multiple sources.
In the years that followed, a series of other mass tort cases were
brought and many continue to be brought. Many of these involved
comparatively new drugs and useful chemicals—for example, DES, 19 the
Dalkon Shield,20 Agent Orange,21 and Bendectin.22 Others involved
hazardous waste.23 In each instance, there was a long-tail between exposure
to the drug or substance and the manifestation of alleged disease or injury.
The pharmaceutical and chemical revolutions of the twentieth century were
responsible not only for the harms at issue, but also in many instances for the
evidence that made it possible for mass tort cases to be instituted. 24 Only
because twentieth century science and medicine were able to point to the
drugs and chemicals at the heart of each case as being responsible, or
potentially responsible, for the injuries and diseases for which the plaintiffs
sought to hold the defendants liable could these mass tort cases have any
chance of success.

18

Daniel King, Asbestos Manufacturers (Mar. 1, 2021), ASBESTOS.COM, https://www.asbestos.
com/companies/ [https://perma.cc/Z2AN-QGHY]. This was a 2002 estimate; the current
number is probably close to one million claims.
19
See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab’ys, 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal. 1980) (explaining that
diethylstilbesterol (DES) was administered to the plaintiffs’ mothers for preventing
miscarriage and was later linked to cancerous growths in daughters exposed in utero).
20
See., e.g., In re N. Dist. of Cal. “Dalkon Shield” IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp.
1188, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (involving a class action lawsuit raised by thousands of women
who alleged they were injured by a defective intrauterine device).
21
See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1051–52 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) (reviewing liability for harm caused by Agent Orange, an herbicide used by the
government in Southeast Asia).
22
See, e.g., In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 301–02 (6th Cir. 1984)
(presenting the claim that Bendectin, a prescription drug intended to alleviate morning
sickness in pregnant women, caused birth defects).
23
See, e.g., Ayers v. Jackson Twp., 525 A.2d 287, 291 (N.J. 1987) (considering an appeal of
judgment in favor of residents who sued township for damages from drinking contaminated
well water).
24
Another species of suit that sometime bears a resemblance to mass tort is the public
nuisance action seeking damages for remedying a long-latent danger posed by such
substances as lead paint. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428,
434 (R.I. 2008) (hearing a lawsuit raised on behalf of the state of Rhode Island against
manufacturers of lead paint and their trade association). Because many of the liability issues
in such suits differ from those posed in tort actions, I set these aside, although it is worth
noting that the liability insurance issues that such cases pose resemble those posed by mass
tort liability insurance claims.
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Then pollution liability came into the picture. In 1978, residents at a
housing development at Love Canal, near Niagara Falls, New York,
discovered that hazardous waste long buried under the area was leaking into
their basements. A prolonged national controversy focused on this particular
site, but subsequent investigation revealed that there were actually thousands
of hazardous waste deposit sites around the country posing or with the
potential to pose hazards to health and the environment. 25 These sites almost
all involved long-tail harms, since it turned out that they often had been
leaking pollutants, and contaminating groundwater and property, for decades.
In December 1980, the lame-duck Congress responded by adopting
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (“CERCLA”).26 Nicknamed the Superfund Act, the legislation was
directed at cleanup, or “remediation,” of sites where hazardous substances
(most often waste) posed an environmental health risk. The scope of
CERCLA liability for environmental cleanup was unprecedented. Any party
who had been associated with a site as an owner, operator, or generator of waste
deposited there was subject to a rigorous regime of retroactive, strict, and joint
and several liability for the sometimes enormous cost of environmental
cleanup.27 Under CERCLA, a responsible corporate party could be held liable
for tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in environmental cleanup costs,
arising out of activities in which it and other corporations had engaged,
sometimes as long ago as the late nineteenth century.28
The following sections discuss how cases involving long-tail injury,
disease, property damage, and environmental pollution tend to share a
number of other characteristics that have corresponding and similar
consequences. First, the massive scale of these cases often is a product of the
long-tail harms they involve, and this massive scale generates methods of
litigation and settlement that are collective rather than individual. Their
massiveness makes doing individual justice in such cases difficult. Second,
the cases tend to involve very high stakes, because of the amount of money at
risk. For this reason as well, the cases tend eventually to be settled rather than
litigated to a judgment, because both private plaintiffs and private defendants
are risk-averse. Third, long-tail claims often pose quintessentially difficult
25

The story of the Love Canal as told from the standpoint of one of the participants can be
found in LOIS MARIE GIBBS, LOVE CANAL AND THE BIRTH OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
MOVEMENT 19–21 (2011).
26
Codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9674.
27
42 U.S.C. §§ 9606–07; ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, DAVID L. MARKELL, WILLIAM W.
BUZBEE, DANIEL R. MANDELKER & DANIEL BODANSKY, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
LAW AND POLICY 875–77 (6th ed. 2011).
28
CERCLA liability was challenged, in this respect and others, as being unconstitutionally
retroactive, but the challenges were quickly rejected. See, e.g., State ex rel Brown v. Georgeoff,
562 F. Supp. 1300, 1302, 1316 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (rejecting defendant’s statutory interpretation
argument that congressional intent weighs against retroactive application of CERCLA).
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causation questions, largely because of the length of time between the
defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct and the manifestation of injury, disease,
or damage that may have been caused by that conduct. All three characteristics
combined to help change the nature of litigation over long-tail harm.
A. Massive Scale
Perhaps the single most significant characteristic of long-tail claims
is that so many of them involve large numbers of claimants. 29 This is no
surprise. The longer the tail, the more difficult it is likely to be to connect past
conduct with present harm. If exposure to a particular substance causes a
disease that manifests itself in only a few unrelated people twenty years later,
it is extremely unlikely that anyone would ever be able to identify a causal
connection between exposure of these few individuals to the substance and
their contracting the same disease many years later. A pattern emerges only
when there is a large number of parties suffering a particular kind of harm,
and the characteristic these parties have in common is then recognized to be
past exposure to a particular substance or form of conduct. The pattern and
the causal connections the pattern reflects may be identified through rigorous
epidemiology, as was the case with asbestos,30 or through less formal
investigation and recognition.31
A second reason that the large scale of many long-tail cases is no
surprise is that the cost of bringing small-scale cases often would be
prohibitive. The economies of scale that are available to plaintiffs’ counsel
when a large number of individuals is harmed make it more cost-effective to
bring such cases, especially when identification and subsequent proof of

29

One commentator has characterized mass torts generally as having the characteristics of
large numbers of claimants, geographic and temporal diversity, and similar factual patterns:
RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT xii–xxiii (2007). For
Nagareda’s purposes, this appears to include both short-tail and long-tail claims but to
exclude abrupt disasters that injure large numbers of people at the same time and place.
30
See Irving J. Selikoff, Jacob Churg & E. Cuyler Hammond, Asbestos Exposure and
Neoplasia, 188 JAMA 142, 142 (1964) (studying the incidence of death due to lung cancer
among workers in asbestos-producing industries).
31
Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin
Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1993) (identifying different methods of proving
causation); Mark Geistfeld, Scientific Uncertainty and Causation in Tort Law, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 1011, 1012 (2001) (discussing how to determine whether a substance is hazardous for
the purpose of legal causation); David E. Bernstein, Getting to Causation in Toxic Tort
Cases, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 51, 69 (2008) (asserting that modern rules of evidence limit the
admissibility of expert testimony to prove causation unsupported by underlying studies).
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causation are expensive because they depend on substantial scientific
investigation.32
Massiveness also facilitates cooperation among counsel for different
plaintiffs and various forms of consolidated procedure that reduce the per
claim cost of litigation and thereby make it more feasible for plaintiffs’
counsel to withstand defense efforts to raise the cost of litigation for
plaintiffs. These include class action certification, 33 multi-district
consolidation, jointly-conducted discovery, and the use of test cases for
trial.34 These devices were little used or unknown in tort cases before the
advent of long-tail claims. The devices are now a routine feature of many tort
suits involving large numbers of claims, including claims that do not involve
long-tail liability.35
Finally, the massive scale of many long-tail cases makes it a virtual
necessity to develop formal or informal facilities to process the settlement of
cases that do not, and as a practical matter cannot, go to trial. 36 Claimants
must be categorized, based mainly on the seriousness of their alleged injuries,
but also sometimes based on other factors, so that their claims can be
processed efficiently. 37 Although conventional tort cases rarely go to trial,
refusing to settle and demanding one’s day in court is still theoretically
In the MER/29 cases, plaintiffs’ counsel cooperated pre-trial in a variety of ways, including
on joint discovery, presaging the method in which much mass tort litigation would proceed
in ensuing decades. See Rheingold, supra note 15, at 121–30 (describing the importance of
massive pre-trial discovery that came with consolidating the MER/29 cases).
33
There are now substantial barriers to bringing mass tort suits as class actions, but these
were only erected in the late 1990s. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
594, 622 (1997) (overturning lower court’s finding that asbestos plaintiffs met predominance
requirement for class certification); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 848 (1999)
(rejecting class certification for failure to demonstrate limited fund treatment); Charles
Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1357, 1420–21 (2003) (discussing the economy of class actions to mass torts).
34
See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659,
667 (1989) (identifying early uses of test cases, multiple juries, collateral estoppel, and
consolidation); Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG.
495, 499 (1991) (noting the important differences between consolidated suits and class actions).
35
McGovern, supra note 34, at 688–94 (advocating for a “hybrid process” of case
consolidation that could apply to all mass tort cases).
36
See Ian Ayres, Optimal Pooling in Claims Resolution Facilities, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
159, 161–65 (1990) (suggesting a possible model for settlement of claims); Francis E.
McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1365
(2005) (“The tort paradigm, for example, is of one or more defendants being held liable to
an individual . . . . In tort cases involving large numbers of plaintiffs, this model is generally
a fiction . . . .”).
37
McGovern, supra note 36, at 1372 (identifying methods for assessing damages); Deborah
R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A SocioLegal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 1048–52 (1993) (explaining the conflicting interests
of opposing parties in mass litigation).
32
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possible for plaintiffs in such cases. That is a virtual impossibility in cases
with massive numbers of plaintiffs. They have access only to what amounts
to court-supervised administrative compensation.
Devising and administering long-tail mass tort claim settlement
facilities has become a sophisticated art. The individuals who serve as special
masters or fund administrators have therefore been called upon to apply their
skills to administer compensation funds in other settings that draw upon tort
compensation funds as models for their operation. Kenneth Feinberg, for
example, began by administering mass tort compensation funds, and then
became a prominent public figure when he directed the 9/11 and Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill funds.38
B. High Stakes
The sheer number of plaintiffs—thousands or even tens of
thousands—in many long-tail tort cases means that the cases pose the
potential for hundreds of millions of dollars of liability, or more. Early in the
history of asbestos litigation, Manville Corporation (formerly Johns Manville),
one of the major historical makers of asbestos-containing insulation, was
driven into bankruptcy in 1982 by the liabilities it faced.39 A.H. Robbins,
maker of the Dalkon Shield IUD, faced so many suits alleging it was liable for
punitive damages that in 1985 it too sought bankruptcy protection.40
Superfund liability usually involves only federal or state
governmental plaintiffs, although at multiparty sites such as landfills there
may be hundreds of responsible parties who are defendants. But regardless
of the number of parties, soon after CERCLA was enacted, the monetary
stakes turned out to be enormous. Cleanup costs at a major site could easily
exceed $100 million.41 Within a few years, the projected cost of cleanup of

38

See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 28–54 (2006) (describing the author’s experience as
special master of the 9/11 fund); KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT: FAIR
COMPENSATION AFTER TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL xiv–xviii (2012) (describing
the importance of the author’s work on the 9/11 fund as a factor in his later selection to
administer the Deepwater Horizon fund).
39
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R. 420, 424–26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (adjudicating
the bankruptcy of the Manville Corporation largely attributed to asbestos health litigation).
40
A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 996 (4th Cir. 1986) (adjudicating the
bankruptcy of A.H. Robins Company, manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, noting the millions
of dollars spent in defense litigation related to harms caused by the IUD device.)
41
As of 1989, the average cost to remedy hazardous conditions at a site was $30 million. Kenneth
S. Abraham, Cleaning Up the Environmental Liability Insurance Mess, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 601,
603 (1993) (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/RCED-90-22, SUPERFUND: A
MORE VIGOROUS AND BETTER MANAGED ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IS NEEDED 2 (1989)).

360

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[March 2021

sites nationwide was several hundred billion dollars.42 As of 2003, the EPA
calculated that it had assessed risks at over 44,000 sites, that remediation had
been conducted at 7399 sites, and that 11,000 sites remained active. 43
The high cost of cleanup turned on a number of factors, but the most
important factor was that the principal cost of cleanup often involved
decontamination of groundwater—water in underground aquifers. Unlike
contaminated soil, which can be excavated, groundwater typically is
decontaminated by pumping the water out of the ground and treating it. Thirty
years or more may be necessary to accomplish decontamination when
groundwater underlying many square miles of property has been
contaminated.44
Two consequences of the high stakes in long-tail cases should be
emphasized. First, in many mass tort cases, neither plaintiffs nor defendants
could afford to risk everything by trying cases, even setting aside the
administrative infeasibility of doing so. The certainty provided by settlement,
even for an enormous sum in the aggregate, was preferable to the risk posed
by not settling.45 As noted above, rather than litigate, A.H. Robins entered
Chapter 11 and established a $2.8 billion fund to compensate women who
were injured by its Dalkon Shield intrauterine device. 46 And in the Superfund
context, there was almost always what amounted to settlement. Responsible
parties’ liability was so nearly certain that negotiations were over such

42

See THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 151 (referring to cleanup cost estimates of
$500 billion). A more partisan but nonetheless representative estimate was that there were
36,000 sites requiring cleanup and that the cost of cleanups under Superfund and related
programs would exceed $750 billion. HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP PROJECT, STICKER
SHOCK: RECOGNIZING THE FULL COST OF SUPERFUND CLEANUPS iii (1993), https://p2info
house.org/ref/33/32340.pdf [https://perma.cc/M64W-BZ3L].
43
MARK REISCH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IB10114, BROWNFIELDS AND SUPERFUND ISSUES IN
THE 108TH CONGRESS 6 (2004).
44
See Linly Ferris & David Rees, CERCLA Remedy Selection: Abandoning the Quick Fix
Mentality, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 785, 832 (1994) (citing estimates that it could take 100 to 1000
years to completely decontaminate an aquifer by the pump and treat method).
45
Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 952–
56 (1996) (discussing breast implant settlements); JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL:
A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 89 (1998) (“[T]he substantial weight of the scientific
evidence fails to support the conclusion that Bendectin causes birth defects . . . .”); MICHAEL
D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC
SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 207–11 (1996) (describing how uncertainty in toxic substance
cases often impedes settlement until bankruptcy proceedings).
46
See Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
79, 100–104 (1990) (describing the outcome of the Dalkon Shield cases, including the
creation of an over $2 billion claimants trust); George Rutherglen, Distributing Justice: The
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund and the Legacy of the Dalkon Shield Claimants
Trust, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 673, 674–75 (2005) (citing the Dalkon Shield Claimants
Trust as a model for the 9/11 Fund).
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matters as the choice of cleanup remedy and the relative responsibilities of
multiple parties.47 The plaintiff—usually the EPA—held all the cards.
Second, many defendants paid so much to settle their liabilities that it
made sense for them to invest considerable sums to finance litigation of their
claims for insurance coverage against their historic CGL insurers. The
amount of money involved in long-tail civil liability therefore made it
virtually inevitable that, after resolution of the underlying long-tail tort or
CERCLA liabilities, there would follow high-stakes insurance coverage
litigation between the defendant/policyholders and their many insurers.
C. Difficult Causation Issues
One of the more challenging features of many long-tail cases involves
proving causation. The longer the tail, the greater the possibility that, rather
than the defendant’s having caused the plaintiffs’ harm, some causal force
operating subsequent to the time of the defendant’s conduct is responsible for
some or all of that harm. 48 Cases involving long-tail liability have produced
most of the innovative doctrines governing proof of causation that are now
part of the common law of torts.
Plaintiffs in long-tail cases face the challenge of proving both
“general” and “specific” causation. That is, there must be proof both that the
substance for which the defendant is the source can cause the disease in
question (general causation), and that this substance did cause the disease in
question in a particular plaintiff (specific causation). 49 This poses the problem
of the “indeterminate plaintiff.” Plaintiffs often also face the challenge of
47

See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ROBERT H. ABRAMS, ROBERT L. GRAHAM, LISA
HEINZERLING, DAVID A. WIRTH & NOAH D. HALL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY:
NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 724 (4th ed. 2010) (“For many lawyers representing PRPs, the
problem is less one of environmental law than it is one of engaging in strategic behavior to
minimize both the amount spent on cleanups and the share of the cleanup cost allocated to
their clients.”).
48
In two important long-tail areas this problem has not arisen because the plaintiffs have
suffered a “signature” disease. That is, the plaintiffs have diseases that are only caused by
exposure to a particular substance. In the DES cases, this was vaginal adenocarcinoma. See
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 144 (5th ed. 2017)
(describing plaintiffs’ argument that vaginal adenocarcinoma “could be caused only by
exposure to DES” such that “if the plaintiff had that disease, then it was caused by DES”).
There was also a strong and established connection between exposure to asbestos and lung
disease. See Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1975)
(detailing how prolonged exposure to asbestos and the subsequent manifestation of the lung
disease, asbestosis, can be accurately understood as a continuing tort). There are few
signature diseases, however, and these are the only long-tail signature diseases that have
figured in litigation.
49
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c
(AM. L. INST. 2005).
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identifying the particular defendant responsible for their particular injury or
disease.50 This is the problem of the “indeterminate defendant.”
1. The indeterminate defendant
The area where the challenges posed by the causation element in longtail claims has produced the most significant doctrinal innovations involves
identifying which of a number of parties actually caused a particular plaintiff’s
injury or disease—the problem of the “indeterminate defendant.”51 That is,
sometimes both general and specific “substance causation” are proved, but
proving the identity of the party or parties responsible for the substance that
caused harm to any particular plaintiff is a challenge.
For example, over a period of decades, many enterprises made or used
asbestos-containing products; plaintiffs may have difficulty proving the
particular source of their exposure, or may have been exposed to asbestos
from more than one source. Similarly, more than one company marketed the
anti-miscarriage drug, DES. Plaintiffs in the DES cases, who were the daughters
of women who had taken DES while they were pregnant and given birth to
babies who eventually developed cancer, were almost always unable to identify
the company that had sold the DES taken years earlier by their mothers.52
Beginning with the Borel asbestos case in 1973,53 the courts
addressed the problem of the indeterminate defendant by relaxing the
traditional requirement that the plaintiff prove the portion of his or her total
injury caused by each negligent or otherwise-liable defendant.54 All
defendants responsible for a significant exposure of the plaintiff to asbestos
were held jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s disease. 55 The
traditional requirement had already been supplanted in many conventional
injury cases, with a rule that shifted the burden of apportionment to
defendants and imposed joint and several liability only if they failed to satisfy

50

Id.
See LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1062–66 (2d
ed. 2008) (providing an overview of the indeterminate defendant problem in mass torts).
52
Sindell v. Abbott Lab’ys, 607 P.2d 924, 926–28 (Cal. 1980).
53
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
54
Id. at 1103.
55
For a discussion of the impact of this approach, see Jane Stapleton, The Two Explosive
Proof-of-Causation Doctrines Central to Asbestos Claims, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1013–
17 (2009) (describing the tendency of the courts post-Borel to hold any defendant responsible
for significant early asbestos exposure in a plaintiff jointly and severally liable for the
plaintiff’s total harm). Indeed, the logic of this doctrine leads to the conclusion that for
practical purposes, what the plaintiff must prove is only that the defendant exposed the
plaintiff to the risk of contracting asbestosis. Id. at 1029.
51
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that burden.56 But there was never any possibility of apportionment in most
asbestos cases or in cases similar to it. The new approach imposed full
liability on any defendant whose conduct had contributed to the plaintiff’s
harm. That approach now applies across the board to long-tail and non-longtail cases alike.57
A second approach to the indeterminate defendant problem, adopted
mainly in DES cases, was market-share liability.58 Under this doctrine,
defendants who had sold DES during the period of exposure during the
pregnancy of the plaintiff’s mother were held liable for the plaintiff’s damages
in proportion to their market shares.59 Market-share liability has also been
applied to a number of other substances.60 In addition, market-share liability
has been a catalyst for academic writing about various forms of proportional
liability. The thinking in this writing continues to percolate in the field.61
56

See, e.g., Maddux v. Donaldson, 108 N.W.2d 33, 38 (Mich. 1961) (holding that the
perceived injustice to the plaintiff victim outweighed the due process concerns of potentially
holding two tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for an injury); Landers v. E. Tex. Salt
Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex. 1952) (holding that, where blame cannot be
apportioned with reasonable certainty against defendant tortfeasors, the plaintiff is allowed
to choose their method of recovery from one or more defendants under the doctrine of joint
and several liability).
57
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28
cmt. m. (AM. L. INST. 2005) (stating that, where a plaintiff can prove that exposure to any
defendant’s product was a relevant contributing factor to the plaintiff’s injury, all relevant
defendants may be held liable for the injury).
58
The seminal case is Sindell v. Abbott Lab’ys, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
59
See, e.g., id. at 937 (“Each defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment
represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the
product which caused plaintiff’s injuries.”).
60
See, e.g., Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 562–63 (Wis. 2005)
(applying a “risk-contribution” theory to lead paint); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823
P.2d 717, 727 (Haw. 1991) (applying market-share liability to blood products).
61
See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 867 (advocating using market-share apportionment
of liability in cases where it is unclear what firm in the market has caused a plaintiff’s injury);
Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1381 (1981)
(criticizing market-share liability recovery as an unfair externalization of costs for enterprises
under the modern tort system); Glen O. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and
Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 781 (1985) (discussing some
academics’ support for more probabilistic apportionment of causal responsibility in tort, in
contrast to an all-or nothing apportionment strategy); Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71
MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1221 (1987) (advocating for a new method of proportional recovery
under a “most likely victim” approach, limiting recovery to only those plaintiffs who can
establish a high causal likelihood between their injury and the defendant’s product); Andrew
R. Klein, A Model for Enhanced Risk Recovery in Tort, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173, 1184–
1210 (1999) (advocating the position that pre-symptom, post-exposure plaintiffs should only
be allowed to recover damages if they can prove exposure has at least doubled their risk of
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2. The indeterminate plaintiff
The law governing proof of specific causation in cases involving
tortiously-caused disease has undergone considerable development as a result
of long-tail cases. This is because of what has sometimes been called the
problem of the indeterminate plaintiff. 62 If general causation is proved, but
specific causation is uncertain because the cause of any particular plaintiff’s
disease or injury may have been either the tortious conduct of the defendant
or something else, which individuals who have experienced the disease fall
into which category? For example, a certain percentage of women suffer from
endometriosis.63 Women who used the Dalkon Shield IUD for birth control
suffered from this condition at a higher rate than women in the general
population. But some women who used the Dalkon Shield contracted
endometriosis that the Dalkon Shield did not cause. Which women suffered
from this condition because of the properties of that device, and which
women did not? The longer the period between the time a defendant’s tortious
conduct occurred and the time that a plaintiff’s injury or disease manifested
itself, the greater the possibility that some other force, such as the conduct of
another party, or the “natural” background occurrence of a disease such as
endometriosis, is responsible for the plaintiff’s condition.
As a result of cases involving long-tail injury, the use of
epidemiological and statistical forms of proof to address specific causation
has become more common than in the past. For example, this sort of proof
was used in the Agent Orange and Bendectin cases, though it seems not to

disease); Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 963, 980–81 (2003)
(discussing the practical implications of requiring firms to compensate victims for their
injuries using a probabilistic, market-share liability approach); Allen Rostron, Beyond
Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share Liability for Nonfungible Products,
52 UCLA L. REV. 151, 153–54 (2004) (advocating for the abolition of the fungibility
requirement of liability apportionment to recover under a theory of market-share liability).
62
See, e.g., MULLENIX, supra note 51, at 1049–61 (providing an overview of the
indeterminate plaintiff problem in mass torts).
63
Endometriosis is a condition in which the endometrial cells that line the uterus grow
outside the uterus, such as in the ovaries or fallopian tubes. Endometriosis, MAYO CLINIC,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/endometriosis/symptoms-causes/syc20354656 [https://perma.cc/B3WE-H47K]. A major allegation in the Dalkon Shield IUD
litigation was that infections caused by the design of this device resulted in endometriosis in
many of the women who used it, with consequent conditions involving difficulty in ovulation
and conception. See, e.g., Setter v. A. H. Robins Co., 748 F.2d 1328, 1329 (8th Cir. 1984)
(reviewing a negligence suit filed after plaintiff suffered injury from her use of the Dalkon
Shield IUD); Gardiner v. A. H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 1984)
(highlighting a separate lawsuit against A.H. Robbins filed after a plaintiff claimed to have
suffered injury from use of the Dalkon Shield IUD).
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have risen to a sufficient level. 64 This problem is even more severe in cases
seeking compensation for disease caused by exposure to hazardous waste,
because such waste is a mixture of numerous substances not a single, uniform
chemical compound such as a drug or pesticide. The “substance” to which
plaintiffs have been exposed therefore varies from waste site to waste site.
Consequently, epidemiological proof is less likely to be available or
sufficiently probative in such cases, because rates of disease are not
necessarily comparable at different sites.
Nonetheless, disputes over the legitimacy of such forms of proof, and
of the respectability of the experts who testify about it, characterized longtail claims almost from the beginning. And they have given rise to important
precedents. Two of the most significant decisions from the Supreme Court
on the admissibility of expert testimony addressing causation – one of them
the now-central and much discussed Daubert case—arose out of long-tail tort
claims.65 The standards articulated in these cases govern not only expert
testimony in federal courts, but also at least by strong analogy in state courts
that operate under rules of evidence highly similar to the federal rules. The
standards for admissibility of expert testimony developed in these cases now
govern generally in all cases, whether long-tail or conventional tort cases, and
in all other civil cases as well. The problems of proving causation in long-tail
liability cases gave birth to the standards. 66
***
To sum up, over the last fifty years, long-tail injury and damage has
given rise to a new kind of lawsuit, often involving massive numbers of
claimants, high stakes, and difficult problems involving proof of causation.
New practices and new legal doctrines have been generated as a result of this
64

For a discussion of the implications of applying a statistical epidemiological threshold
requirement for establishing causation, see GREEN, supra note 45, at 310–17.
65
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 582–83 (1993) (involving birth
defects allegedly caused by exposure in utero to the morning sickness drug Bendectin); Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139–40 (1997) (involving small-cell lung cancer allegedly
caused by exposure to PCBs and other chemicals in dielectric fluid).
66
Logically, the problems of the indeterminate plaintiff and the indeterminate defendant do
not have to arise only in long-tail cases. Individuals can contract disease or suffer injury
shortly after exposure to substances or conduct that may or may not actually have caused the
injury or disease; and a plaintiff clearly injured or suffering disease as a result of recent
exposure to a product or substance (e.g., toxic-shock syndrome) may be unable to identify
the party responsible. But long-tail injury and disease claims generated the early cases that
developed approaches to these problems, and then served as sources of thinking and doctrinal
development in later, short-tail cases. If the long-tail claims had not existed, the new forms
of thinking and doctrinal development might well never have occurred.
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litigation, many of which affect not only long-tail litigation but tort liability
in general. The old world of sporadic injury and the tort liability that governed
it are now accompanied by a new world of long-tail liability and the
innovative legal doctrines and procedures that accompany it.
II. THE NEW WORLD OF INSURANCE LAW
Substantial as was the impact of long-tail claims on the development
of tort law and tort litigation during the last fifty years, it cannot compare to
the impact of this form of liability on insurance law and practice. Because of
long-tail insurance coverage claims, the world of insurance law doctrine,
practice, and the insurance markets moved from the sleepy backwater where
they had long resided to a prominent place in the litigation universe.
Three developments, described in detail below, figure directly in the
story. First, in 1966, the standard-form “CGL” insurance policy was revised
to eliminate a long-running dispute about whether the standard policy
covered liability for long-term hazardous exposure: it did. Within a few years,
the new policy language left insurers highly vulnerable to claims for
insurance coverage of bodily injury and property damage caused by
pollution, at the very time when these kinds of claims were escalating.
Second, within a few years, policyholders also began to make claims against
their CGL insurers for coverage of the potentially enormous liabilities that
they faced in the mass tort actions involving long-latent injury and disease
resulting from drug and chemical exposures that were filed against them in
the 1970s. Third, in 1980 CERCLA was enacted, and claims for coverage of
liability for pollution cleanup under CERCLA—a wholly new form of
liability—also were made.
The following Sections describe how, as a result of these
developments, unprecedented levels of insurance litigation took place,
involving billions of dollars of potential coverage responsibility, and the
entire landscape of insurance law was transformed. Because insurance
coverage law is state contract law, even when an underlying liability incurred
by the policyholder is based on a federal cause of action (such as CERCLA),
it was natural for divisions of authority on key questions to emerge. For many
years there were many states without authoritative precedents governing key
issues. As a result, decisions about where to bring suit, and the prediction of
outcomes that was a predicate to such decisions, became crucial. Entire
departments of major corporate law firms became dedicated to high-stakes
insurance coverage litigation. Hundreds of judicial decisions around the
country slowly yielded a series of new concepts and doctrines, addressing
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issues that had never before been envisioned, let alone resolved.67And
eventually, as a consequence, new forms of liability insurance were
introduced. The period from roughly 1980 to 2000 would be a watershed in
the history of insurance law and practice, entirely remaking the field.
A. The Occurrence-Based Liability Insurance Policy and the “Trigger” of
Coverage
Businesses in the U.S. had long protected themselves against tort and
other forms of civil liability by purchasing “CGL” (first “Comprehensive
General Liability” and now “Commercial General Liability”) insurance. This
form of insurance has been sold since 1941, and before that a policy that
resembled it was sold.68 From then until now, the standard CGL policy insured
businesses against liability for damages incurred “because of bodily injury and
property damage.”69 The key to determining whether a policy at least
potentially provided coverage was when the bodily injury or property damage
in question occurred. The policy provided coverage of liability incurred
because of bodily injury or property damage that occurred “during the policy
period,” regardless of when the tortious conduct that caused injury or damage
had occurred. This criterion would later be termed the “trigger” of coverage. 70
Bodily injury or property damage could occur “during the policy
period,” yet remain latent for years to come. In such a case, bodily injury or
property damage would trigger coverage under a CGL insurance policy issued
years, perhaps decades, before the filing of a suit alleging that the policyholder
was liable for damages incurred because of that injury or damage. A
policyholder sued in tort in 1980, for example, could be covered against that
liability under a policy issued in 1955, if that is when the injury or damage in
question had occurred, even if it had not been discovered until 1980.71
There is no evidence, however, that from the 1940s until the late
1970s, insurers gave serious consideration to this possibility, or to its
implications. That is why they waited so long to revise their policies, and why
their failure to do so contributed to the rise of coverage claims against them
in the decades to come. Although no one has ever explained this failure, I
67

See generally Abraham, Mega-Coverage Litigation, supra note 5 (explaining that mass tort
toxic liability emerged within a short window of time and that the body of doctrine could not
develop quickly enough to meet policyholders’ and insurers’ need for a mature body of law).
68
See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 435
(6th ed. 2015) (discussing the structure of pre-1985 insurance policies that predate
contemporary CGLs but closely resemble modern CGL policies in form and function).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 475.
71
See THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 155–57 (describing the evolution of case
law recognizing a longer period of limitations).
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think it occurred for a number of reasons.72 First, during this period, insurers
would justifiably have expected to be protected by the effects of statutes of
limitations on the right to bring suit alleging liability for long-latent injury or
damage. Because the applicable period of limitations typically began to run
on the date that a plaintiff’s injury or damage began to occur, even if that
harm had not yet been discovered, long-latency claims would ordinarily fall
outside the period statutorily permitted for bringing suit. Only as judicial and
statutory exceptions to statutes of limitations for undiscovered injury or
damage were increasingly created in the 1960s would insurers have felt this
protection to be dissolving.73 Second, prior to 1970, there had been few suits
alleging any kind of long-tail liability. It probably appeared to insurers that,
if policyholders were not being held liable for long-tail harm, then their
liability insurers were not at risk of having coverage responsibility for longtail liability, and these insurers did not need to develop insurance policy
language detailing the effects on coverage of liability for different forms of
long-latent harm.
Finally, from the time the first standard-form CGL insurance policies
were marketed in 1941, insurers seem to have envisioned that the policy
would only cover liability for harm caused by abrupt events that resulted in
immediate or near-immediate injury or damage. This is because CGL policies
covered liability imposed because of bodily injury or property damage caused
by “accident.”74 Insurers’ conception was that an accident was an abrupt
event.75 Although it is logically possible for an abrupt event, such as an
explosion, to cause harm that would not manifest itself for some time after
the explosion, that does not appear to have been part of the paradigm
“accident” insurers had in mind. Most abrupt events cause injury or disease
immediately and are known to have done so immediately, or at least within a
short period of time. Few such events would be expected to cause injury or
illness during the policy period – and therefore to trigger current coverage –
72

There is some evidence in the drafting history from the 1960s that some consideration was
given to the problem that might arise if multiple policies covered a liability because it involved
harm that occurred over a period of years, but the drafters apparently decided not to address the
issue. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: LIAB. INS. § 41 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2019) (recognizing
that the record seems to support the concept of stacking; that is, “multiple per-occurrence policy
limits are available in the event of harm that takes place over multiple years”).
73
See Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1204–05
(1950) (recommending the adoption of discovery exceptions but recognizing that they did
not exist in most instances); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30
(4th ed. 1971) (indicating that most jurisdictions had adopted the discovery rule).
74
ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at 436.
75
For examples of courts finding that non-abrupt or imminent events were accidents, see
cases cited in Nancer Ballard & Peter M. Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the
Comprehensive General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 609, 623 nn. 51–
52 (1990).
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without manifesting themselves at virtually the same time. Insurers therefore
seem not to have envisioned the possibility that their policies could cover
liability for bodily injury or property damage that occurred during the policy
period, but was not actually discovered until many years later.
For all three reasons, as time went on, the insurance policy language
introduced in 1941 would turn out to be incomplete and underdeveloped in ways
that eventually would produce disputed claims and considerable litigation.
1. The shift to occurrence-based coverage
In the 1950s a new species of tort suit started to test insurers’
conception, just described, of what their CGL insurance policies did and did
not cover. Some policyholders began to make claims for coverage of liability
for harm that was not caused by an abrupt event, but by continuous or longterm exposure to hazardous conditions. For the reasons I have just indicated,
CGL insurers took the position that the harm resulting from slow or
continuously occurring exposure to a hazardous substance or condition was
not caused by “accident,” because it did not occur abruptly. Therefore, they
contended, their policies did not cover liability for that kind of harm.
The few cases that ruled on the issue produced a division of
authority.76 But the possibility that their policies would cover liability for
continuous or long-term exposure to hazardous conditions had begun to occur
to CGL insurers. Further, it seems likely that at least some of these insurers
began to contemplate the corresponding possibility that it would be a policy
issued years or decades earlier that provided this coverage, because the
trigger of coverage under their policies was bodily injury or property damage
during the policy period. Although this kind of liability was not yet being
referred to as “long-tail” liability, the possibility that CGL insurers had in the
past issued policies that already covered some of these liabilities was about
to be brought into sharp relief.
The question whether accident-based policies did cover what would
later be called long-tail liability, however, was never definitively answered.
In my experience, the reason is that, in order to increase their share of the
U.S. CGL insurance market, London-based insurers (led by Lloyd’s) began
to offer an “occurrence” endorsement (effectively, a supplement) to U.S.
policyholders that rendered the issue moot. The endorsement added coverage
of liability caused not only by accident, but also by an “occurrence,” and
defined that term as an “accident, including injurious exposure to
76

See, e.g., Beryllium Corp. v. Amer. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 223 F.2d 71, 74 (3d Cir. 1955)
(holding that the term “accident” was ambiguous and construing the policy in favor of
coverage); Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 104 N.E.2d
250, 254–56 (Ill. 1952) (same).
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conditions.”77 It is difficult to see this addition to coverage as anything other
than a recognition that the policy was to cover liability for harm caused by
pollution and other similar, slowly-occurring processes. Whether the insurers
recognized that some such processes would cause harm during the policy
period that was not discovered until much later is not clear. Regardless, as we
will see later, although the Lloyd’s shift to occurrence-based coverage
probably did increase its share of the U.S. market for CGL insurance,
eventually the long-tail chickens would come home to roost: by the 1990s,
Lloyd’s faced financial disaster and had to restructure itself precisely because
of the extent of liability it faced under the occurrence policies it had sold to
U.S. policyholders in the previous decades. 78
CGL insurers in the United States, in order to compete with Lloyd’s,
then exposed themselves to the same vulnerability. To meet the challenge
posed by the London policies’ extension of coverage, in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, U.S. insurers began to issue policies containing similar
occurrence-based coverage, through amendments that provided coverage in
an “endorsement” added to the policy.79 In 1966, when the U.S. standardform CGL policy underwent its next major revision, the new policy form
recognized this development, by shifting from accident-based to occurrencebased coverage in the body of the policy itself rather than by endorsement.80
In contrast to harm caused by abruptly occurring “accidents,”
continuous, long-term exposure to harmful conditions is much more likely to
cause bodily injury or property damage that does not manifest itself for a
considerable period of time. This is because such exposure is more likely to
cause insidious disease than are abrupt events, which tend to be violent and
therefore to cause easily recognized injury. Thus, whether the change in
policy language merely clarified what had already been the case, or actually
added coverage that the CGL policy had not provided to that point, for
policies issued thereafter this issue became moot. As of 1966, the standard
CGL policy, which already contained the potential to cover long-tail liability,
now did so in clear terms. Yet this was the very point at which environmental
consciousness, and the potential for increased environmental liability, placed
insurers at greater risk.
2. Insurers get cold feet: the partial pollution exclusion
CGL insurers’ timing in ensuring that their policies covered liability
for harm caused by continuous, hazardous exposure could not have been
77

THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 157.
See infra discussion accompanying notes 199–203.
79
THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 157.
80
Id.
78
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worse. The 1966 occurrence-based CGL policy was promulgated at what
turned out to be a pivotal point in the history of environmental law. The halfdozen years from late 1960s to the early 1970s saw important social and legal
change in this field. The Torrey Canyon shipwreck polluted miles of the
French and English coastlines in 1967, with worldwide publicity. 81 A major
oil spill off the coast of California in 1969 polluted the ocean and the beaches
near Santa Barbara.82 On June 22, 1969, pollutants on the surface of the
Cuyahoga River in Cleveland caught fire. 83 The first “Earth Day” was held
in April 1970.84 In the wake of and in response to these events, the U.S.
Congress enacted a series of measures that brought federal environmental
regulation into the modern era, such as the National Environmental Policy
Act in 1969;85 the Clean Air Act in 1970;86 and the Clean Water Act in
1972.87 Environmental consciousness and the prospect of increased
environmental liability were on the rise.
All this of course happened just a few years after adoption of the new
occurrence-based CGL insurance policy, which much more clearly covered
liability for pollution, including long-tail harm caused by pollution, than the
accident-based policy that it replaced. Just a few years after promulgating the
new policy form, insurers began to recognize the rising potential for their
policyholders to incur liability for pollution. As a result, they got cold feet.
Beginning by endorsement (around 1970) and then by revision in the body of
the standard-form CGL insurance policy in 1973, insurers added what came
to be called a “qualified” pollution exclusion. 88
What made the pollution exclusion “qualified” was that it was a
partial exclusion only. This was accomplished by excluding coverage of
liability for bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge of
pollutants but making an exception for discharges that were “sudden and
81

Bethan Bell & Mario Cacciottolo, Torrey Canyon Oil Spill: The Day the Sea Turned Black,
BBC NEWS, (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-39223308 [https://
perma.cc/BZM2-WWZU].
82
See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the party
responsible for the 1969 spill could be liable to commercial fishermen if their profits were
reduced by harm to the area fish).
83
Julie Grant, How a Burning River Helped Create the Clean Water Act, ALLEGHENY FRONT
(April 21, 2017), https://www.alleghenyfront.org/how-a-burning-river-helped-create-theclean-water-act/ [https://perma.cc/Y3RD-7FXZ].
84
EPA History: Earth Day, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/history/epahistory-earth-day [https://perma.cc/YRA5-TJQZ].
85
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
86
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-606, 84 Stat. 1676.
87
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816.
88
See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW 145–63 (1991)
(explaining the origins and evolution of the pollution exclusion); THE LIABILITY CENTURY,
supra note 1, at 160 (same); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 79–81 (Ill. 1997)
(providing the history of the pollution exclusion).
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accidental.”89 It is likely that, from the insurers’ standpoint, this change
reinstated, for pollution liability, the requirement that harm be caused by an
abrupt event. Since much, perhaps most, pollution takes place over the long
term, this could have been seen as a quiet, but substantial, reduction in the
scope of this expanded coverage. But the insurers did not portray it that way
at the time. On the contrary, they downplayed the significance of the new
exclusion in a manner that approached misrepresentation. 90
For much of the 1970s, what the pollution exclusion actually
accomplished remained uncertain. Most of the legal action on the pollution
front until the late 1970s involved the legislation (and subsequent
administrative environmental regulation) described above, not tort liability
for pollution damage or for the costs of pollution remediation. Consequently,
there also was little litigation relating to insurance of liability for pollution
during that period, and therefore little occasion for the courts to interpret the
meaning and scope of the pollution exclusion.
But the issue was a time bomb, and the bomb eventually exploded. In
1982, a New Jersey appellate court, affirming a 1979 trial court decision that
had garnered considerable attention, held that the term “sudden” in the
“sudden and accidental” exception to the pollution exclusion in a CGL policy
was ambiguous.91 That term, the court ruled, could mean either abrupt or
unexpected. Since the provision was drafted by insurers, the court invoked
the doctrine contra proferentem and interpreted the exception to the exclusion
against the drafter and in favor of coverage. 92 This meant that, for courts that
would adopt the same approach, the pollution exclusion did not preclude
coverage of liability for harm caused by gradual, unexpected, and accidental
pollution—exactly the kind of pollution that was most frequently the subject
of massive amounts of liability under CERCLA.
Within a few years, that would turn out to be the kind of pollution that
resulted in potential liability, and subsequent insurance coverage claims,
associated with thousands of hazardous waste deposit sites. As with the other
common law issues already discussed, the meaning of the pollution exclusion
was a question of state contract that would take several decades for the courts
89

ABRAHAM, supra note 88, at 146; Am. States Ins. Co., 687 N.E.2d at 81.
Through their drafting organization, the Insurance Services Office (ISO), the insurers
sought approval from state insurance commissioners to incorporate the exclusion in CGL
policies. A letter that often accompanied requests for approval typically indicated that
“[c]overage for pollution or contamination is not provided in most cases under present policies
. . . . The above exclusion clarifies this situation.” ABRAHAM, supra note 88, at 156 (quoting
Insurance Rating Board, Submission to Insurance Commissioner of West Virginia, May 18,
1970); see also Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 855 (N.J.
1993) (discussing the legal significance of the representations contained in the letter).
91
Jackson Twp. Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990, 995
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
92
Id.
90
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in various states to resolve. In the meantime, high stakes litigation over
insurance coverage proceeded.
B. Claims for Coverage of Mass Tort Liability
Although pollution liability and the insurance issues that would
accompany it did not materialize in much litigation until the 1980s, the mass
tort cases filed in the 1970s spawned highly significant insurance litigation
late in the decade. Asbestos bodily injury cases are a prime, but no means
exclusive, example. The occurrence-based policies that many corporate
policyholders had purchased beginning in the late 1950s were highly
vulnerable to claims for coverage of liability for bodily injury and property
damage caused by asbestos. And the prior accident policies, though perhaps
not quite so clearly vulnerable, were targets as well.
The typical plaintiff in an asbestos tort action had been exposed to
asbestos for a number of years. A typical policyholder was the defendant in
suits brought by thousands of individuals. The defendants in these cases
turned to their CGL insurers for coverage of their liabilities. Medical
testimony in these cases often showed that not only did breathing air
containing asbestos fibers cause immediate lung damage, but also that, even
after an individual ceased breathing asbestos fibers in the air, the continued
presence of the fibers in the lungs aggravated already-existing injury.93
Policyholders therefore argued that all the policies in force during the period
running from first exposure to manifestation of a plaintiff’s asbestos-related
lung disease were triggered.94
These corporate policyholders had purchased their CGL coverage in
layers, with a single insurer issuing a primary policy and other insurers
supplying successive layers of excess liability insurance. A policyholder
might therefore have had CGL insurance policies issued by dozens, or even
hundreds, of insurers over a period of decades. A suit for coverage of
asbestos-related liability would therefore be brought against all of the dozens
or hundreds of insurers whose policies were “on the risk” during the relevant
multi-year period. Perhaps the most vivid example of the size and complexity
of the mass tort insurance coverage litigation came in a consolidated set of
asbestos insurance coverage cases, in which there were so many parties that
the trial had to be held in a school auditorium big enough to fit all the lawyers.95
The principal legal issues these suits posed were whether these
policies were triggered, and if so, how coverage responsibility was to be
93

The seminal case on the issue was Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
94
Id. at 1039.
95
In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases: Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 1072,
CJC90001072 (Cal. Super. Ct., S.F. 1989).
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allocated among triggered policies. But there were other legal issues as well.
And in many of the mass tort insurance coverage cases, there was also a major
factual issue: whether the policyholder had “expected or intended” harm to
result from exposure to asbestos, since there was no coverage under any
policy that was on the risk when the policyholder expected harm. 96 Insurers
made strenuous efforts to obtain evidence that the policyholder had expected
harm at some point, and at what point that was. This issue complicated
coverage cases exponentially, because it often involved extensive document
discovery, and the location and subsequent depositions of former or retired
employees who may have been in a position to know the dangers posed by
the product or substance in question at some point in the distant past.97
C. CERCLA Pours Gasoline on the Fire
The enactment of CERCLA in 1980 added a host of significant new
features to the insurance law challenges that the mass tort cases were already
beginning to pose. Most of the mass tort cases that had by then resulted in
insurance coverage litigation did not involve conventional environmental
pollution; most did not involve what could be called pollution at all. A whole
series of pollution coverage issues were posed by claims for insurance of
CERCLA liabilities that simply did not arise in claims for coverage of mass
tort liabilities.
It was not only the range of new insurance coverage issues that
CERCLA liability introduced, however, that made its influence so great. It
was also the sheer amount of coverage litigation that CERCLA liability
spawned. At that point there were comparatively few major mass tort cases.
Although there were dozens of actual and potential defendants in asbestos
cases, there was only a single defendant or just a few defendants in the other
mass tort cases. Consequently, there were actually comparatively few
insurance coverage cases being pursued at that point.
In contrast, there were many hundreds and quite possibly thousands
of entities who were potentially responsible for cleanup under CERCLA. By
1992, the National Priority List of just the major sites that the EPA had

96

See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1204–05 (2d
Cir. 1995) (discussing the dimensions of the expected or intended harm issue in a coverage
policy long-tail setting).
97
In the case of Johns-Manville, this sort of discovery eventually uncovered an arguably
smoking-gun letter written in 1935 by the company president to one of the company’s
attorneys, acknowledging that exposure to asbestos posed risks that it would be better to keep
the public from knowing (“the less said about asbestos, the better off we are”). PAUL
BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 116–17 (1985)
(quoting a letter from Sumner Simpson to Vandiver Brown).
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identified listed 1207 such sites.98 The EPA projected an ultimate total of
4500 NPL sites,99 and had an inventory listing over 34,000 sites,100 many of
which involved multiple potentially responsible parties.101 All of these parties
became potential, and often actual, plaintiffs in insurance coverage suits. This
meant that long-tail liability insurance coverage litigation went from being
an identifiable and growing feature of insurance law to being a massive and
widespread phenomenon, with tens, and perhaps hundreds, of billions of
dollars at stake for the insurance industry. This litigation overshadowed
everything else going on in insurance law and practice at the time.
D. A Generation of New Insurance Law
Litigation over coverage of long-tail liabilities arising out of mass tort
and environmental cleanup liability was particularly intense in the 1980s and
1990s, as courts in different states resolved numerous issues of first
impression.102 A whole new body of insurance law doctrine emerged.
Resolution of the legal issues generated by long-tail insurance coverage
continues to this day; entire treatises are now devoted to it. I discuss the most
important doctrines and concepts in this Section, identifying and explaining
first the doctrines that pertain directly to long-tail coverage, and then those
that arose out of long-tail coverage disputes but have broader application.
Many, though by no means all, of the decisions and doctrines that I
discuss below tended to afford policyholders either full or partial coverage of
their mass tort and CERCLA liabilities, for several reasons. First, in some
instances the policy language at issue clearly provided coverage. Second, in
other cases the policy language was ambiguous, and there was no extrinsic
evidence (such as trade custom, the parties’ course of dealing, representations
made in negotiations for the purchase of coverage, or industry-wide policy
drafting history) sufficient to clarify what was intended. Consequently, the
courts applied the doctrine contra proferentem and construed the ambiguous
policy language against its drafter (the insurer), in favor of coverage.
Finally, insurance coverage law was not and is not bifurcated—the
same rules governing the meaning and application of CGL insurance policies
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., RCED-92-138, SUPERFUND: PROBLEMS WITH THE
COMPLETENESS AND CONSISTENCY OF SITE CLEANUP PLANS 11 (1992).
99
U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE TOTAL COSTS OF CLEANING UP NONFEDERAL SUPERFUND
SITES x (1994).
100
ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT, CLEANING UP HAZARDOUS WASTE: IS THERE A
BETTER WAY? 23 (1993).
101
See, e.g., id. at 87 (describing the Lone Pine landfill site in New Jersey, where there were
156 potentially responsible parties).
102
By 1991, there were enough decisions and new doctrines to fill an entire treatise. See
generally ABRAHAM, supra note 88 .
98
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apply both to sophisticated multinational corporations and small businesses
covered by these policies. For example, a decision denying coverage of
CERCLA liability to a major corporation such as DuPont or Exxon, on the
ground that cleanup costs are not “damages” covered by the policy (see
below), would also apply to a local dry cleaning business covered by a CGL
insurance policy facing potentially bankrupting liability for cleanup of a
municipal site where its waste products had been deposited. For all these
reasons, the overall tendency of the body of new doctrines was coveragefavoring rather than coverage-denying.
The following subsections address insurance law doctrines that are
complex, intricate, and sometimes difficult to follow for those who are not
already immersed in the field. But that is part of the point. It is worth working
through the details of these doctrines, both to understand the many ways in
which they expanded the scope of insurance coverage of long-tail liability
under policies that insurers had already sold and also to appreciate why it
took the courts so long to work through the issues that eventually led to
adoption of these doctrines. Nothing about the insurance litigation of the
1980s and 1990s was easy for the courts, and that is why the common law
process of applying past policies to the new forms of liability took so long.
1. Long-tail coverage doctrines
a. Trigger
The starting point in any long-tail insurance claim is the trigger-ofcoverage question. I noted earlier that what activated, or triggered, CGL
insurance policies was the occurrence of bodily injury or property damage
“during the policy period.”103 The first question, therefore, was what counts
as bodily injury or property damage for purposes of determining what
happened “during the policy period.” The pivotal trigger question was not so
much when harm first occurred, although that could sometimes pose a difficult
factual question, sometimes with legal ramifications when harm was, for
example, sub-cellar. Rather, the most significant issue was whether coverage
provided in successive years also was triggered when harm that had begun to
occur during a prior policy year continued to occur in subsequent years.
There was medical testimony in asbestos bodily injury cases, for
example, that harm to lungs from exposure to asbestos continued to occur
even after airborne exposure ceased. This was termed “exposure-in103

See, e.g., Am. Home Prod. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1489, 1513
(S.D.N.Y 1983) (concluding that coverage is only trigged by “exposure or manifestation”
when those events are in and of themselves “an injury, sickness or disease for which an
insured may be held liable”); see also THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 155
(describing the “trigger” of coverage concept, which exposes insurers to long-tail liability).
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residence.” In the earliest prominent case on the trigger issue in this context,
Keene Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, the D.C. Circuit ruled that
bodily injury had occurred during every policy year from the year of first
exposure to the year when lung damage first manifested itself. This was
termed the “continuous trigger.”104 Other courts in analogous circumstances
held that, depending on the evidence, a somewhat similar “injury in fact”
trigger approach could yield the conclusion that multiple policy years had
been triggered by injury suffered by a single individual over time. 105
In cleanup coverage cases there were analogous rulings based on the
notion that waste slowly migrating through groundwater caused new harm to
previously uncontaminated water and that, therefore, there was property
damage during the policy period in multiple years as a result of contamination
at a single site.106 As compared to a single-year of coverage being triggered,
the multi-year-trigger holdings meant that sometimes twenty or thirty times
as many insurance policies, and insurers, were vulnerable to claims for
coverage of the policyholder’s liability. And this meant that twenty or thirty
times more money was at stake for the policyholder and the insurers as a
group. Obviously, it is worth investing a lot more in a case that may yield an
insurance recovery of $200 to $600 million than in a case that can yield, at
most, $10 to $20 million. The complexity and intensity of coverage battles
therefore escalated accordingly.
b. Allocation
The fairly routine triggering of multiple policy years in long-tail
insurance claims was only the first step in the process that produced
exponential aggravation of mega-coverage litigation. Once the courts held
that multiple policy years could be triggered, the crucial issue became
whether and to what extent the coverage provided in each year could be
stacked together, so that the policyholder had access to all of the triggered
coverage. This question thus concerned the allocation of coverage
responsibility among multiple triggered policy years. Since many large
companies facing long-tail liabilities had been purchasing CGL insurance—
104

See Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding
that “any part of the single injurious process” could trigger coverage).
105
See Am. Home Prod. Corp., 565 F. Supp. at 1508 (holding that the policy language was
consistent with the expectation that coverage would include injuries that occurred under
previous policies).
106
See, e.g., N. States Power v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657, 664 (Minn. 1994)
(stating that courts had previously concluded the contamination of groundwater was a
continuous process resulting in damage); Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Admiral Ins. Co.,
913 P.2d 878, 904 (Cal. 1995) (“We therefore conclude that the continuous injury trigger of
coverage should be applied to the underlying third party claims of continuous or
progressively deteriorating damage or injury . . . .”).
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sometimes hundreds of millions of dollars-worth of it—for decades, whether
all this coverage was available, or only some of it, could mean as much as
half a billion dollars to each individual company facing liability, and to its
liability insurers as a group.
In theory the policies covering any particular triggered policy year
would cover only liability for the damages imposed because of the bodily
injury or property damage that occurred during that year. But for practical
purposes there usually was no way to apportion such liability or damages. An
asbestos plaintiff had only one lung disease, not a set of partial diseases or
injury that had occurred in a particular year. At a hazardous waste site, the
waste deposited in each year typically had leached out of the site and
combined. Consequently, ordinarily the damage to a plaintiff or to property
at a site was indivisible by year. 107
Most courts addressing the allocation issue held in such instances that,
in order to recover, the policyholder did not have to apportion damage by
year when the damage was theoretically or practically indivisible. Rather,
each policy could be held liable for damage that occurred partly during its
policy year and partly during other years. 108 The policyholder was thus
entitled to call upon all triggered years for coverage. That is, in cases
involving damage that was not divisible by year, “stacking,” or adding
together the coverage applying to different triggered years, was permitted.
But the method under which coverage could be stacked mattered as
well. There were two general approaches, though each had nuances. The first
approach held that the policies (primary and excess) that were in force during
all triggered policy years were subject to what amounted to joint-and-several
liability for their coverage responsibilities. A policyholder could select a
triggered year, access the coverage provided by the policies applicable to that
year until they were exhausted, and, if these did not fully cover a judgment,
select another year until the amount of the covered judgment was fully
reimbursed.109 This could easily mean that policies providing $100 million or
107

In re Silicon Implant Ins. Coverage Litig., 667 N.W.2d 405, 418 (Minn. 2003) (citing
ABRAHAM, supra note 88, at 120).
108
See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at 475 (describing courts’ adoption of
multiyear injury-in-fact triggers).
109
See, e.g., State v. Continental Ins. Co., 281 P.3d 1000, 1008 (Cal. 2012) (applying stacking
to allow the insured immediate access to the purchased insurance); Plastics Eng’g Co. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 759 N.W.2d 613, 625 (Wis. 2009) (holding that the insurer was
responsible up to the policy limit once the policy was triggered); Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 769 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ohio 2002) (adopting the stacking
approach to seek full coverage from an individual policy out of any of the triggered policies);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1060 (Ind. 2001) (“[O]nce an occurrence
takes place, Allstate is obligated to indemnify Dana for all sums related to that occurrence
up to the policy limits.”); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502,
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more in any given year, over a period of twenty or more triggered years, could
all be held to have covered a judgment against the policyholder.
The alternative was pro-rata allocation.110 Under this approach,
coverage responsibility is pro-rated by year among triggered policy years. If
a $200 million liability triggered twenty policy years, then each policy year
would be potentially responsible for its pro-rata share of $10 million. If the
policyholder had not purchased $10 million or more of coverage during any
of those years, then it could recover at most the amount of coverage it had
purchased. The result is that the pro-rata approach can never be more
advantageous than the joint-and-several approach for a policyholder, and
often will be less advantageous.
Complicated as these trigger and allocation issues are, I have vastly
oversimplified them. They generated many subsidiary issues, such as how to
handle cases in which some insurers whose policies were triggered had
settled with the policyholder and some had not; 111 how to determine how
many occurrences had caused harm, when policies provided coverage on a
per occurrence basis and applied deductibles on the same basis; 112 and what
507–08 (Pa. 1993) (using the language of the policies themselves to justify the stacking
approach). This whole approach is sometimes termed “vertical” allocation. See Viking Pump
v. TIG Ins. Co., 52 N.E.3d 1144, 1156 (N.Y. 2016) (discussing vertical exhaustion as being
consistent with stacked allocation). This is because, for any selected policy year, insurers are
liable in the order in which they provide coverage, from primary, to first-layer excess, and
so on up the layers of coverage.
110
See, e.g., Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 303 (Mass. 2009)
(detailing how the pro-rata approach aims for equity across a time period and often requires
policyholder participation); Towns v. N. Sec. Ins. Co., 964 A.2d 1150, 1165–67 (Vt. 2008)
(utilizing pro-rata allocation of indemnity costs between the parties); Consol. Edison Co. of
N.Y., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 687, 695 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that pro-rata
allocation was consistent with “the amount of time the policy was in effect in comparison to
the overall duration of the damage”); Mayor of Balt. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 802 A.2d 1070,
1103–04 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (holding that the facts allowed for pro-rata allocation,
which was more consistent with the continuous trigger at issue).
111
See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. One Beacon Am. Ins. Co., 864 F.3d 130, 150–51 (2d Cir. 2017)
(determining that the effect of prior settlement should be considered in allocation); Koppers
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1449–56 (3d Cir. 1996) (evaluating the impact
of settlement on judgment and determining that the lower court erred by not accounting for
previous settlements); Dresser Ind. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 106 S.W.3d 767,
771 (Tex. 2003) (holding that not all prior judgments preclude further litigation).
112
See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1191 (2d
Cir. 1995) (“[E]ach installation of NGC’s products constituted a separate occurrence,
requiring the application of another deductible.”); London Mkt. Ins. v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 154, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (considering the implication of aggregating
deductibles: that some claims could be aggregated); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 765 A.2d 891, 896–909 (Conn. 2001) (summarizing relevant case law relating to
per occurrence policies and deductibles); Plastics Eng’g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 759
N.W.2d 613, 623 (Wis. 2009) (concluding that “continued and repeated” exposure
constituted a single occurrence in this case).
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to do when some triggered policies were issued by now-insolvent insurers.113
In addition, a current issue that is still hot after all these years is how
to treat years when insurance against the liability in question was not
available. Is the insured to be treated as a self-insurer for these years, or is
coverage responsibility pro-rated only to years when insurance could have
been purchased? For example, once the qualified and absolute pollution
exclusions became standard provisions in CGL policies, arguably insurance
against cleanup liability was not “available,” at least under the pollution
exclusion law of some states. If years when these exclusions were
incorporated into a policy were nonetheless responsible for coverage, then
the policyholder could be a self-insurer for those years when insurance
against pollution was unavailable. Tens or hundreds of millions of dollars
could turn on the answer to this question in each individual case. And the
answers are still coming in.
c. The qualified and absolute pollution exclusions
Although the pollution exclusions do not apply exclusively to longtail liability, these policy provisions have been so centrally involved in longtail litigation that I consider them here. I have already indicated that, beginning
in the late 1970s, the courts split over the meaning of the exception to the
qualified exclusion for bodily injury or property damage caused by a “sudden
and accidental” discharge of pollutants.114 Many courts held that the term
“sudden” had a temporal component and meant “abrupt,”115 but other courts held
that the term was ambiguous, and that the exclusion therefore did not preclude
coverage of liability for harm caused by discharges that occurred gradually.116

113

See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 221 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing
a New York rule that requires the insured to bear the pro-rata share of the insolvent insurer’s
indemnity); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fairbanks Co., 170 F. Supp. 3d 634, 647 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (discussing conflicts between Georgia and New York insurance insolvency laws).
114
See supra notes 89–91.
115
See, e.g., Buell Indus. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 791 A.2d 489, 499 (Conn. 2002)
(defining sudden as occurring “abruptly or within a short amount of time”); Dimmitt
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fid. Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700, 704 (Fla. 1993) (“As
expressed in the pollution exclusion clause, the word sudden means abrupt and
unexpected.”); Northville Indus. Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 679 N.E.2d
1044, 1047 (N.Y. 1997) (finding that excluding a temporal element from the definition of
“sudden” would render the sudden exception redundant).
116
See, e.g., Hecla Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Colo. 1991) (refusing
to accept a purely temporal connotation of “sudden”); Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
380 S.E.2d 686, 690 (Ga. 1989) (concluding that the ambiguity should be construed in favor
of the insured to mean “unexpected and unintended”); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1218 (Ill. 1992) (resolving ambiguity in favor of the insured,
especially when the ambiguity is found in an exclusionary clause).
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Such interpretations made it possible for policyholders to secure
coverage of liability for billions of dollars of CERCLA liability. Along with
decisions on trigger and allocation, this interpretation led to the 1986 revision
of the standard-form CGL insurance policy, most prominently to the
incorporation of an “absolute” pollution exclusion in that policy.
But there is now a division of authority about the meaning of that
exclusion. The definition of a “pollutant” in the standard CGL policy is
extraordinarily broad: “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant . . . .”117 Under this definition, spicy mustard splashed into an
individual’s eye could be considered a “pollutant.” Given the breadth, and
arguable overbreadth, of this definition, courts struggle with the appropriate
scope of the exclusion. Some courts hold that the exclusion must be interpreted
in light of its purpose, which was and is to preclude coverage of liability for
harm caused by what they sometimes call “traditional environmental
pollution,”118 a phrase that itself is not self-defining. Under this interpretation,
the exclusion does not apply to harm caused by carbon monoxide fumes inside
a building119 or water that backs up from a sewer system.120
Other courts, however, interpret the exclusion “as written,” and apply
it to liability for harm that would not be considered “environmental” in the
traditional sense, such as ammonia fumes emitted from a blueprint
machine121 and lead paint in a hospital. 122 Thus, nearly fifty years after a
pollution exclusion was first included in CGL policies, the courts are
continuing to grapple with the difficulty of distinguishing between covered
and excluded liability for harm that, in a non-technical sense, many observers
would conclude was caused by pollution.
2. New, generally applicable doctrines
A number of other issues that could have been raised even before
long-tail insurance coverage litigation arose, but rarely were raised, have
experienced significant doctrinal development as a result of long-tail
insurance litigation. In the Section, I briefly canvas the major doctrines that
burgeoned and became much more significant as a result of long-tail
litigation, despite the fact that they then applied across the board.

117

ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at 453.
See e.g., Amer. States Ins. v. Koloms, 687 N.E. 2d 72, 82 (Ill. 1997) (excepting carbon
monoxide from a broken furnace as not being contemplated by the exclusion clause).
119
Id.
120
Minerva Enters. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 851 S.W.2d 403, 405–06 (Ark. 1993).
121
Deni Assocs. of Fla. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135, 1141 (Fla. 1998).
122
Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Cowen Constr., Inc., 55 P.3d 1030, 1034–35 (Okla. 2002).
118
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a. The meaning of “damages”
CGL policies cover only liability payable “as damages.” Early on in the
development of long-tail insurance coverage litigation, a hotly-litigated question
was whether CERCLA liability, especially when created by an administrative
order or injunction directing a responsible party to undertake cleanup,
constituted “damages.” Prior to the enactment of CERCLA, only a handful of
cases had addressed whether the costs of complying with certain forms of
injunctive relief constituted “damages” under liability insurance policies, each
holding that these costs were not damages.123 The issue barely existed.
This then became a key question, because CERCLA liability rarely is
imposed by virtue of governmentally-financed cleanup and a subsequent
cost-recovery suit against responsible parties. Rather, whenever a responsible
party is available and solvent, an administrative or injunctive cleanup order
is the EPA’s first choice. After some fits and starts applying the traditional
rule,124 most courts eventually held that both forms of CERCLA liability are
payable “as damages.”125 If this had not been the case, little of the vast body

123

See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955) (reasoning
that the term “damages . . . has an accepted meaning in law” that does not include the costs
of complying with an injunctive decree ordering the removal of rocks and the building of a
bulkhead); Garden Sanctuary, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 292 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974) (distinguishing injunctive relief from damages on the ground that the latter are
“remedial rather than preventive” and noting that “[t]he expense of restoring plaintiff’s
property” in compliance with an injunctive decree was not remedial); Desrochers v. N.Y.
Cas. Co., 106 A.2d 196, 198 (N.H. 1954) (observing that if a plaintiff’s injuries are
“permanent and irrevocable” plaintiff would be entitled to damages that may trigger an
insurer’s obligation).
124
See, e.g., Md. Cas. Co. v. Armco, 822 F.2d 1348, 1354 (4th Cir. 1987) (following Hanna
to find that costs of CERCLA compliance are not damages and so are not covered by
Armco’s insurance policy); Mraz v. Canadian Univ. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir.
1986) (finding that plain language of CERCLA’s relevant provisions indicates that
“[r]esponse costs [of waste cleanup] are not themselves property damages.”).
125
See, e.g., A.Y. McDonald Indus., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 620 (Iowa
1991) (giving damages the meaning “the ordinary reasonable person would believe the term
to mean” and finding that this meaning encompassed CERCLA response costs); Aetna Cas.
& Sur. v. Kentucky, 179 S.W.3d 830, 838–39 (Ky. 2005) (agreeing with the “majority of
state appellate courts” that the “ordinary” meaning of damages encompasses response and
cleanup costs mandated under CERCLA for the purposes of remedying ongoing injury);
Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16, 19 (Me. 1990) (mentioning, but
declining to follow, courts that found coverage for government-mandated cleanup costs by
reasoning that ordinary people cannot understand the narrower legal meaning of “damages,”
which does not include such costs); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 665
N.W.2d 257, 280–81 (Wis. 2003) (rejecting a “too-confining, overly technical definition of
‘damages’” and arguing that a broader definition which includes CERCLA response costs
does not render the term “damages” mere surplusage because CGL policies do not cover the
costs of complying with general regulations or prospective conduct).
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of insurance law doctrine that subsequently emerged would have been
necessary, because insurers would have been able to avoid covering most
CERCLA liabilities.
b. The meaning of “expected”
A principal exclusion in CGL and other liability insurance policies
precludes coverage of liability for harm that is “expected or intended from
the standpoint of the insured.” Some insurers argued (based partly on the
phrase “from the standpoint of the insured”) that the test for what was
expected was fully or semi-objective, and that the exclusion applied if a party
in the insured’s position should have expected harm.126 In its most extreme
version, this argument would have inserted a negligence exclusion into
insurance policies designed mainly to cover liability for negligence. Most
courts therefore rejected this argument, confirming that the test is
subjective.127 There remained, however, questions regarding whose
expectation counted, and what had to be expected, under the exclusion. For
example, was bodily injury or property damage excluded when a single lowlevel employee expected it, or was some level of management complicity
required? Similarly, was coverage of liability for mesothelioma precluded if
the maker of insulation containing asbestos expected some minor lung damage
to result from exposure to airborne asbestos, but had no reason to expect that it
would result in lung cancer? Was coverage of liability for groundwater cleanup
precluded if damage to topsoil from the deposit of waste was expected, but no
harm to groundwater was envisioned? To this day, the case law on these subissue “expected or intended” questions is sparse.128 We can expect that it will
be still more decades before definitive doctrines govern this issue.
c. The scope of the owned-property exclusion
CGL policies have long excluded coverage of liability for harm to
property owned, rented, or occupied by the insured. The idea behind the
exclusion is that the risk that one’s property will be damaged is the province
See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1205 (“. . .
[T]he Insurers contended that coverage of the underlying asbestos-related bodily injury
claims should be precluded because NGC ‘expected’ or “intended” the injuries within the
meaning of the ‘occurrence’ definition.”).
127
ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at 500.
128
See, e.g., Am. Fam. Ins. Co. v. Walser, 628 N.W.2d 605, 611–12 (Minn. 2001) (holding
that once some harm is expected or intended, the type of harm that occurs is irrelevant to
application of the exclusion); Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kment, 658 N.W.2d 662 (Neb. 2003)
(same); SL Indus. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1266, 1274–75 (N.J. 1992) (holding
that a different type of harm than was expected is not excluded); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n
v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (same).
126
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of first-party property insurance, not liability insurance. 129 Many CERCLA
cleanups took place on property owned by the insured. Frequently, however,
pollutants escaped beyond the boundaries of property owned by the insured
and contaminated non-owned property. Because the source of contamination
is on the insured’s property, sometimes cleanup of the owned property is
necessary to remedy or prevent further contamination of non-owned property.
The question is whether and to what extent the exclusion applies to cleanup
of owned property.
A few of the first cases to apply the owned-property exclusion when
there was no offsite damage held that the cost of cleanup of owned property
was not excluded as long as harm to non-owned property was “imminent.” 130
These early decisions proved to be outliers, however, as most courts held that
the exclusion applied unless there had already been actual damage to nonowned property.131 Further, when that was the case, there would have to be
apportionment of the cost of cleanup of owned property, as between costs
benefiting owned property (to which the exclusion applied) and costs benefitting
non-owned property (to which the exclusion did not apply).132 This doctrine now
applies generally; if damage to owned property must be repaired in order to
prevent further damage to non-owned property, then the entire cost of repair is
not automatically excluded by the owned-property exclusion.133
But it is mostly in connection with environmental cleanup that the
owned-property exclusion applies. The rub in this setting turned out to be
that, as I noted earlier, a major portion of CERCLA cleanup costs is
attributable to the cost of decontaminating underground aquifers, or
See ABRAHAM, supra note 88, at 163 (“The ‘owned-property’ exclusion[’s] . . . general
function is to prevent the insured from using a liability insurance policy as if it provided
property insurance.”).
130
See id. (noting that the owned-property exclusion functions whether the contamination
took place on insured’s property or others’ property); Savoy Med. Supply Co. v. F & H Mfg.
Corp. 776 F. Supp. 703, 706–09 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding damage was “outside the confines
of the owned property exclusion” even without evidence that contaminants spread to adjacent
lands or groundwater because the damage posed a threat to the public).
131
See, e.g., Hakim v. Mass. Insurers’ Insolvency Fund, 675 N.E.2d 1161, 1165–66 (Mass.
1997) (holding that insurer was not liable for costs of cleaning insured’s property because
the “sole purpose” of such cleanup was to remediate insured’s property); State v. Signo
Trading Int’l, 612 A.2d 932, 939 (N.J. 1992) (emphasizing “plain language” of CGL policy
that excluded the cost of future damage from coverage and lack of evidence of injury to thirdparty property).
132
See generally Kirby T. Griffis, Note, Apportionment of Environmental Cleanup Costs
Under the Owned-Property Exclusion in CGL Insurance Policies, 80 VA. L. REV. 1351 (1994)
(comparing methods of apportioning costs for environmental cleanup under the ownedproperty exclusion and arguing that clear apportionment rules would have significant benefits).
133
See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Aaron, 685 A.2d 858, 870 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (finding
that owned-property exclusion does not preclude coverage of cost of altering a glass
enclosure in a condominium unit that caused water damage to neighboring property).
129
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“groundwater.”134 By clever advocacy, policyholder lawyers demonstrated
that, under the law of some states, groundwater is not “owned,” or not
“owned” exclusively, by the owner of the land under which the groundwater
is located. Rather, the waters of these states are held in trust by the state for
the people. Therefore, courts held, the owned-property exclusion did not
apply at all to the costs of decontaminating groundwater under the insured’s
property.135 This has been an enormous financial coup for policyholders in
these states, and a blow to their insurers. It has enabled policyholders’ access
to coverage for the cost of cleaning up what everyone had always thought
was their own property.
d. The duty to defend a “suit”
CGL insurance policies embody both a duty to indemnify and a duty
to defend a “suit” that alleges liability falling within the terms of coverage.
Insureds receiving communications from the EPA regarding potential
CERCLA liabilities typically sought defense under their insurance policies, on
the ground that an EPA “PRP Letter” was the functional equivalent of a “suit.”
The courts split on the issue, and this division of authority seems stable.136

134

See Ferris & Rees, supra note 44, at 833 (citing estimates that it could take 100 to 1000
years to completely decontaminate an aquifer by the pump and treat method).
135
See, e.g., United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 738 N.W.2d 578, 585 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007)
(noting that insurers conceded that groundwater was not insured’s property); Schnitzer Inc.
v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 137 P.3d 1282, 1284 (Or. 2006) (rejecting
insured’s argument that insurer was obligated to indemnify insured for future groundwater
decontamination but accepting that the owned-property exclusion does not encompass
groundwater); Norfolk S. Corp. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 859 So. 2d 167, 193 (La. Ct. App.
2003) (agreeing with earlier Louisiana decision that treated groundwater as a “fugitive
subsurface mineral” not owned by insured).
136
Land O’ Lakes, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. Co. of Wausau, 728 F.3d 822, 829 (8th Cir. 2013)
(holding that the insured’s PRP letter from the EPA was “a suit for arguably-covered
damages” as contemplated under the pertinent policies, which triggered their duty to defend);
SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 315 (Minn. 1995) (holding that the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency’s Request for Information letter constituted a “suit”);
A.Y. McDonald Indus. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 629 (Iowa 1991) (holding
that the EPA’s PRP letter and subsequent actions constituted a “suit” under a CGL policy);
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1517 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
PRP letter issued by the EPA constitutes a "suit" because an “ordinary person” would
perceive such a letter as notice of the “effective commencement of a ‘suit’ necessitating a
legal defense.”); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 647 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (D. Idaho 1986) (“The
duty to defend arises upon the filing of a complaint whose allegations, in whole or in part,
read broadly, reveal a potential for liability that would be covered by the insured's policy.”);
Simon Wrecking Co. v. AIU Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp. 2d 624, 637 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (holding
that PRP letters constitute claims, rather than suits).
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***
To sum up, litigation over the issues that long-tail liability generated
was protracted, complex, and expensive. Today, whether an issue arises only
in connection with long-tail coverage or more generally, discussion of these
issues, and the dozens of legal doctrines that pertain to them, now fill treatises
and casebooks. All of these legal issues occupy insurance coverage lawyers
in the kinds of coverage disputes that simply did not exist fifty years ago. In
that space of time, long-tail liability produced a revolution in insurance law.
III. THE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHANGES IN TORT
AND INSURANCE LAW DOCTRINE
Long-tail liability not only had separate, far-reaching impacts on the
common law of tort and the common law of liability insurance. In addition, the
interaction between these two domains as a result of long-tail liability, and the
consequences of this interaction, influenced the two fields in a number of other
fundamental ways. It is no exaggeration to say that the combined effect of these
developments transformed the world of tort law and insurance.
The individual developments discussed below involved the
occurrence of a “crisis” in tort and liability insurance in the mid-1980s; an
antitrust suit brought by nineteen states against the property/casualty insurance
industry; the end of the century-long era of tort liability expansion; the entry of
legislatures into the tort liability arena for the first time; the rise of a new form
of insurance coverage as alternative to the CGL occurrence policy; the most
radical restructuring of Lloyd’s of London in centuries; the advent of insurance
policies, issued in Bermuda to U.S. corporations, that require arbitration of
insurance coverage disputes; and the increased tendency of major corporations
to self-insure non-catastrophic levels of liability instead of relying on liability
insurance. Each of these developments not only figured in the history of tort
and insurance, but influenced their contemporary character.
A. The Liability Insurance “Crisis”
As the long-tail tort and liability insurance litigation that began in the
late 1970s continued, a shock hit the insurance markets. In late 1985 and
1986, premiums for CGL and medical malpractice insurance suddenly
skyrocketed, sometimes doubling or tripling at the time of renewal. Further,
some policyholders in some states, mainly municipalities and obstetricians,
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could not get coverage at any reasonable price.137 The March 24, 1986 cover
of Time Magazine carried the headline, “Sorry, America, Your Insurance Has
Been Canceled.”138
Consumer groups blamed the crisis on an alleged insurance industry
conspiracy to raise premiums, and called for repeal of the special protection
that enabled intra-industry cooperation: the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s 139
longstanding exemption of the insurance industry from the reach of the U.S.
antitrust laws.140 In contrast, the insurance industry—allied with business and
medical interests—and the U.S. Justice Department blamed the crisis on the
expansions of tort and environmental liability, as well as the courts’
interpretation of CGL insurance policies which have been chronicled above.
These interests descended on legislatures to demand tort reform. 141
In actuality, the causes of the crisis were more complicated than either
side recognized. Property-casualty insurance is subject to periodic cycles in
which premiums are comparatively flat for a time and then rise steeply. The
crisis occurred during one of these points in the cycle; it was simply more
severe than past cycles had been. Explanations for this severity probably lie
partly in the rise of mass tort and environmental cleanup liability, but also in
the fact that insurers anticipated losing important advantages under the Tax
137

See Richard N. Clarke, Frederick Warren-Boulton, David D. Smith & Marilyn J. Simon,
Sources of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Economic Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367,
367 (1988) (listing large property-casualty insurance rate increases for various types of
policyholders, including fifty to one hundred percent increases for obstetricians); THE
LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 164 (noting that, during the insurance crisis, “[f]or
some policyholders for a limited time, CGL coverage was not available at any price”).
138
TIME MAGAZINE (Mar. 24, 1986), http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,1986
0324,00.html [https://perma.cc/D9NY-3LJZ].
139
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015.
140
See, e.g., NAT’L INS. CONSUMER ORG., THE LIABILITY CRISIS IN INSURANCE 6–7 (1986)
(proposing changes to the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s exemption for the insurance industry in
order to prevent insurers from fixing prices); Jay Angoff, Insurance Against Competition:
How the McCarran-Ferguson Act Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-Casualty
Insurance Industry, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 397, 402–07, 414 (1988) (arguing that the McCarranFerguson Act was a “major cause” of the insurance industry’s recurring crises, in part
because of its authors’ failure to account for evidence of collusive conduct among insurers).
141
See, e.g., INS. INFO. INST., THE LAWSUIT CRISIS 4 (1986) (attributing the insurance crisis
to the costs of increased liability); THE BUS. ROUNDTABLE, TORT LAW REFORM POLICY
STATEMENT 5, 118–24 (1986) (supporting bill allowing for individual treble damage liability
in antitrust suits on the ground that the bill would prevent antitrust plaintiffs from making
use of “whipsawing” settlement techniques); Clarke et al., supra note 137, at 377 (discussing
common insurers’ argument that changes in tort law which expanded damages and liability
for policyholders made liability insurance scarce and more costly); American International
Group, “There’s a Price to be Paid for Excessive Liability Awards in Our Courts,” WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 1985 at A16 (promising to “continue to speak out for corrective legislation”
to address “enormous” damage awards that “will be paid by all of us who participate in the
economic system.”).
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Reform Act of 1986, and accordingly had made accounting adjustments that
resulted in short-term restrictions of available capital—the raw material of
insurance—that automatically produced premium increases. 142
Those explanations, however, took some time to emerge, and in any
event probably would have been too complex to influence the dramatic
headlines and heated controversy over what or whom to blame for the crisis.
There were subsequent studies and reports analyzing the crisis at both the
federal and state levels, and proposals for insurance and tort law reform by
both government and interest groups.143 Nor were all the bedfellows entirely
comfortable with each other. Many businesses had made claims against or
had been litigating with their insurers over toxic tort, products, and cleanup
liability coverage in the years leading up to the crisis, and then found that
they faced steep premium increases. Although they supported tort reform,
these policyholders had no particular trust in their insurers, especially when
they found, as we will see next, that the industry was also in the process of
cutting back on the coverage it was willing to provide them. Although
eventually the crisis subsided, it has had a lasting impact on those who lived
through it. Insurers felt wrongly accused of conspiracy, and policyholders felt
that their long-time insurers had deserted them. They have dealt with each
other much more clearly at arms-length ever since.144
B. Revision of the CGL Insurance Policy and the States’ Antitrust Suit
By the late 1970s, largely in reaction to the advent of claims for
coverage of the new long-tail liabilities, the Insurance Services Office
(“ISO”)—the policy-drafting and loss-data collecting arm of the propertycasualty insurance industry—began the process of revising the standard-form
CGL insurance policy. 145 By 1983 and 1984, some insurers were pressing
ISO to do away with coverage of long-tail liability altogether, substituting a

142

For analytical studies of the causes of the crisis, see Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense
of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO STATE L.J. 399 (1987); George L. Priest, The
Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521 (1987); Symposium,
Perspectives on the Insurance Crisis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367 (1988); Ralph A. Winter, The
Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE. J. ON REG. 455
(1988); Kyle D. Logue, Toward a Tax-Based Explanation of the Liability Insurance Crisis,
82 VA. L. REV. 895 (1996).
143
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP AN UPDATE ON THE
LIABILITY CRISIS (1987); GOVERNOR’S ADVISORY COMM’N ON LIAB. INS., STATE OF N.Y.,
INSURING OUR FUTURE (1986); INS. SERVS. OFF., INSURER PROFITABILITY: THE FACTS (1986).
144
Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 VA. L.
REV. 85, 102–03 (2001).
145
THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 163.
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new form of liability insurance—claims-made coverage—for the form of
CGL coverage they had been providing for the past 40 years.146
By this point, insurers had seen that many courts were interpreting
CGL insurance policies in ways that, in the insurers’ view, unduly favored
coverage of long-tail liabilities. Decisions that permitted stacking coverage
provided during multiple years, and holding that the term “sudden” in the
exception to the pollution exclusion did not automatically have a temporal
component, were prime examples. 147 In addition, the willingness of the courts
to hold that policy language that insurers had considered clear was in fact
ambiguous, and then to interpret the ambiguous language against the drafter
and in favor of coverage, undermined insurers’ confidence that standard
occurrence-based CGL insurance policies would be interpreted as written. 148
Some insurers therefore wanted to circumvent these problems by
fashioning a new form of coverage. “Claims-made” coverage effectively
eliminates the difficulty of setting premiums for coverage of long-tail
liability, by covering many fewer long-tail liabilities. The trigger of coverage
under a claims-made policy is a claim made (usually a lawsuit) against the
policyholder during the policy period, regardless of how long ago the bodily
injury or property damage alleged in the claim occurred.149 A claims-made
insurer whose policyholder begins to experience long-tail liability claims
during the policy year can anticipate the severity of claims that will continue
to be made in subsequent policy years, and either raise premiums accordingly
or exclude coverage of that particular type of suit altogether. An occurrence
insurer cannot do that because its past policies already cover such liability. In
contrast to occurrence coverage, then, claims-made policies shift part of the
risk of an uncertain liability-and-coverage future to the policyholder, who
then bears more of the risk of long-tail liability than before.
The insurers pressing ISO to revise the CGL policy in the mid-1980s
also favored completely eliminating pollution liability insurance from the
CGL policy by substituting an “absolute” pollution exclusion for the
“qualified” pollution exclusion that had been in the policy since 1973. 150
Reinsurers, including those in Lloyd’s of London, seem to have favored
revision, and at the urging of some insurers, indicated to ISO that they would

146

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 114–16.
148
See 1 REPORTERS’ STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 55, 92
(AM. L. INST. 1991) (“[J]udicial interpretations of policy language that some insurers…had
regarded as fixed, clear, and limiting, have expanded the scope of coverage against both
conventional and newer forms of liability.”).
149
ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at 534–35.
150
Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 74–75 (Ill. 1997).
147
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decline to reinsure CGL insurance policies that were not amended to restrict
or eliminate long-tail coverage.151
As a practical matter, the insurers pressing ISO to revise the standardform CGL policy could not have revised their own policies to conform to
their preferences and then sold these revised policies. At that point in its
history, ISO collected industry-wide claim and loss data and promulgated
advisory premium rates for its existing policies, and recommended rates for
new policies. It would have been economically risky for an individual insurer
to venture to price a new policy on its own. More importantly, however, a
policy with more restrictive coverage than the standard form CGL policy then
in force would have been received unfavorably in the market. Policyholders
would not have bought it in sufficient numbers when a more attractive policy
was available, even if it carried a lower price. 152 Rather, in order to obtain a
revised, more restrictive CGL policy that the market would have to accept
because all insurers offered it alone, the insurers pressed ISO to amend that
policy and discontinue the policy it would replace.
In the end, ISO did not eliminate the occurrence policy, but it did
promulgate a standard-form claims-made CGL policy that insurers could use
if they preferred to do so. The only recommendation that ISO squarely adopted
was to insert an absolute pollution exclusion into ISO’s revised 1986 standardform policy.153 That eliminated a considerable portion of the coverage of longtail liability that CGL policies have provided ever since. But because of the
trigger of coverage under pre-1986 policies, long-tail pollution-coverage issues
under those policies continue to arise and be litigated.154
Just as the controversy over the crisis of 1985–86 was dying down
and the insurance market was stabilizing, however, another striking
development occurred. In 1988, nineteen states brought suit against ISO, the
CGL insurers that had importuned ISO to eliminate long-tail coverage from
the CGL policy, and a number of reinsurance entities,155 alleging that these
151

Other demands were that the claims-made policy be subject to a retroactive date and that
the costs of defense erode policy limits. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.
764, 771 (1993) (“[T]he defendants wanted the ‘claims-made’ policy to have a ‘retroactive
date’ provision, which would further restrict coverage to claims based on incidents that
occurred after a certain date.”).
152
The dynamics of this process are discussed in ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at
36–38 and 167–68.
153
THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 164.
154
See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co., 864 F.3d 130, 138, 154 (2d Cir. 2017)
(remanding for further proceedings a case involving claims for coverage of asbestos
liabilities under CGL policies issued from the 1950s through 1970).
155
In re Ins. Antitrust Litig. 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989), rev’d and remanded, 938
F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); see also Lawrence M. Fisher, States and Industry Battling
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defendants’ threats and conduct in the process of revising the CGL policy
amounted to a conspiracy in violation of the one feature of the Sherman Act
from which the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not exempt them, the
prohibitions against boycott and agreements to boycott. 156
Eventually, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, the Supreme
Court of the United States ruled that the alleged core activities of the defendants
in attempting to have ISO modify its standard-form CGL policy were not
boycotts.157 The case was remanded and settled because, for practical purposes,
the plaintiffs had lost.158 The ruling confirmed that the process by which ISO
prepared standard-form policies, including CGL policies, was not unlawful.
In doctrinal terms, therefore, the case is a landmark clarification of
the meaning of the term “boycott” as applied to the insurance policy drafting
process, though only that. But in practical terms the decision left the
insurance industry free to act collectively in the preparation of standard-form
policies. It enabled the industry to continue to present a unified front in
dealing with the corporations that buy CGL insurance. It left the new worlds
of tort and insurance law in place.
There was another important non-doctrinal subtext in the case,
moreover, that never found its way into a judicial opinion at any of the three
levels where it was adjudicated. The case was brought in the aftermath of the
liability insurance crisis, soon after introduction of the revised CGL insurance
policy that cut back on a significant component of long-tail coverage through
the new, absolute pollution exclusion. The implication of the suit, at least for
some observers, was that the behind-the-scenes maneuvering and threats that
were alleged in Hartford Fire to have led to revision of the CGL policy also
had led to the liability insurance crisis itself.159 The implication of the suit,
that is, was that the steep increases in premiums and the coverage shortages
that produced the crisis were a product of the same kind of conspiratorial
conduct that had led to revisions of the CGL insurance policy that eliminated
coverage of liability for pollution. The suit thus reinforced the climate of
distrust that was already present in the relationship between the corporate
policyholders and their insurers.
on Liability Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1988, at A1 (“The suits contend that four major
insurance companies conspired with Lloyd’s of London, Insurance Services Office Inc. and
others . . . to reduce sharply all liability coverage available to public agencies, businesses and
non-profit organizations.”).
156
McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 1013.
157
509 U.S. 764, 806 (1993).
158
ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at 167.
159
See, e.g., Angoff, supra note 140, at 403 (“[The Texas Attorney General] alleged that
during the insurance crisis, Aetna and other major insurance companies had agreed not to
write certain types of ‘politically sensitive’ insurance in order to pressure state legislators to
enact tort reform.”).
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In the years that followed, the intensity of that distrust may have
waned, but the rising-tide-raises-all-ships mentality that had resulted for
decades in steady renewals of their CGL policies by policyholders, and
willing payment of small and moderate claims by insurers, never returned. 160
Ever since, policyholders have been more willing to consider suing their
insurers, viewing the possibility of suit in the same risk-reward terms that
they employ in assessing other investments. And insurers have taken
positions adverse to their policyholders—such as seeking recoupment of
defense costs 161 and sometimes even recoupment of settlements 162—that
would have been unheard of before the events of the mid-1980s.
The introduction of claims-made CGL insurance was a natural
consequence of all this. Claims-made policies cut out much of the long-tail
coverage that occurrence policies provide. Under claims-made policies the
policyholder is effectively a self-insurer of claims that come in waves, since
the insurer is always free to laser-exclude coverage of a particular form of
liability in subsequent policies. By 2018, roughly 36 percent of all CGL
coverage was written on a claims-made basis,163 and in all probability this
was the only form of coverage that policyholders that pose of substantial risk
of incurring long-tail liability, like drug and chemical manufacturers, could
obtain at tolerable cost.
C. The Deceleration of a Century of Tort Liability Expansion
From the very time it came into being as a recognizable, distinct
category of liability around 1870, the scope of tort liability for accidentallycaused bodily injury and property damages steadily and continually
expanded.164 Much of that expansion involved the progressive breakdown of
See Abraham, supra note 144, at 100–01 (“[I]nstead of bringing policyholders and
insurers back together in the joint enterprise of managing liability risk, the enactment of tort
reform tended to drive them apart.”).
161
See, e.g., Buss v. Superior Ct., 939 P.2d 766, 770 (Cal. 1997) (“[The insurer] reserved all
its rights, including . . . ‘[w]ith respect to defense costs incurred or to be incurred in the
future, . . . to be reimbursed . . . .’”); Shoshone First Bank v. Pac. Emps. Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 510,
514 (Wyo. 2000) (“[The insurer] contends that it is entitled to allocate the defense costs
between the claim for invasion of privacy and all the other claims involved and seek
compensation from Shoshone for the costs of defending the other claims.”).
162
See, e.g., Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Jacobsen, 22 P.3d 313, 314 (Cal. 2001) (“[W]e conclude
an insurer may be reimbursed for a reasonable settlement payment made over the objection
of the insureds.”); Excess Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental
Tools, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 42, 43 (Tex. 2008) (“In Texas, an insurer that settles a claim against
its insured when coverage is disputed may seek reimbursement from the insured should
coverage later be determined not to exist . . . .”).
163
A.M. BEST COMPANY, BEST’S AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES 382 (2017).
164
The story of this expansion is told in G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (expanded ed. 2003).
160
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a series of no-duty and limited-duty limitations on liability for negligence. 165
Workers’ compensation, nominally a restriction of tort liability in that it
immunized employers from liability in tort, adopted an administrative system
of near-absolute employer liability for workplace injury.166 Though literally
it did not involve tort liability expansion, workers’ compensation added
credibility to arguments for moving from negligence to strict liability in tort
itself,167 and served as a reference point in debates about strict liability in tort.
Then, beginning in the early 1960s, the adoption of strict liability for
product defects in state after state took this approach, and to many observers
seemed to signal that the move from negligence to strict liability would
spread. If asked to predict around 1975 whether there would be more strict
liability adopted in the coming decades, I am pretty certain that most tort
scholars would have answered in the affirmative. Some would have
supported such a development and others would have opposed it.
Make no mistake about it: there had been enormous doctrinal
expansion, much of it chronicled in the preceding pages. Expansion
decelerated after 1985 or so, but of course the cat was already out of the bag.
There were few major doctrinal expansions in the scope of common law
liability for accidentally caused physical harm, and there were even a few
retrenchments.168 More than a century of doctrinal expansion of tort liability
slowly came to an end in the next decades. Products liability, which was the
most prominent field in which liability appeared to have moved from
negligence to strict liability, moved back from that stance, and was soon
recognized to be a predominately a form of negligence, and not strict,
liability.169 Market-share liability, which in the early 80s seemed to be the
latest step in the progression of liability expansion, never gained
momentum.170 Liability for negligently-inflicted emotional distress was
165

See Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation,
15 GA. L. REV. 925, 937–938 (1981) (discussing the development of exceptions to the
restricting doctrine of privity, eventually resulting in liability based on fault).
166
See THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 52–57 (tracing the evolution of liability for
worker injury).
167
This was recognized soon after workers compensation came into the picture. See, e.g.,
Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235, 235 (1914)
(suggesting that the principle underlying workers compensation applied to tort as a whole).
168
See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992) (tracing the end of modern tort law’s
expansion to the period between 1981 and 1992).
169
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1997).
170
See, e.g., Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187, 192–93 (Ohio 1998) (rejecting
application to DES); Spencer v. Baxter Int’l, Inc. 163 F. Supp. 2d 74, 81 (rejecting
application to blood products); Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511, 529 (N.J. 1989)
(rejecting application to DPT vaccine); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055,
1068 (N.Y. 2001) (rejecting application to handguns); Black v. Abex Corp., 603 N.W.2d

394

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[March 2021

limited to a narrow set of situations. 171 The century-long era of tort liability
expansion that these developments ended coincided exactly with the advent
of the liability insurance crisis of 1985-86.
Even without psychoanalyzing the judges who sat on state courts of
last resort at that time, it seems clear beyond dispute that the liability and
insurance crisis of the mid-1980s served as a shot across the bow of the
judiciary. For decades, the courts had assumed that where tort liability went,
liability insurance would follow.172 The crisis, however, seemed to show the
judiciary that this was not necessarily true. In addition to the steep increases
in premiums for CGL insurance purchased by corporations, other entities and
individuals whose difficulties were more likely to influence the courts
suffered during the crisis. For example, nurse midwives, municipalities
whose swimming pools had diving boards, and obstetrician-gynecologists
who delivered babies sometimes found for a time that they could not obtain
liability insurance at any price.173
Judges did not have to be convinced that the courts’ expansion of tort
liability was the exclusive cause of these features of the crisis to wonder
whether they had at least contributed to it. This would have been a sobering
concern for judges at all levels. There soon followed work by legal scholars
criticizing the expansion of tort liability and opposing further expansion that
gave judges objective reason for concern. A bit of anecdotal evidence is my
experience, witnessing Stanley Mosk, a Justice of the Supreme Court of
California and a leading proponent of that state’s expansions of tort liability,
at a conference on civil liability at the Yale Law School in 1985. He sat in
the audience as George Priest174 and Richard Epstein175 presented papers
showing what they considered to be flaws in the modern expansions of tort
liability. I suspect that Justice Mosk was surprised to hear his positions
impliedly criticized by scholars from elite law schools, since the elite scholars
of Mosk’s generation (people like William Prosser and Fleming James) had
182, 189 (N.D. 1999) (declining to expand application to asbestos where the record was otherwise
sufficient for summary judgment in favor of the defendants); Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass’n,
690 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa. 1997) (rejecting application to lead pigment in house paint).
171
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829–30 (Cal. 1989).
172
For the classic statement of this position, see Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,
150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (“The cost of an injury and the loss
of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless
one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business.”).
173
See Abraham, supra note 142, at 402 (“Liability insurance for certain risks—directors and
officers, nurse-midwives, day-care centers, bars and restaurants, obstetricians practicing in certain
settings—was unavailable at any price for months at a time in some states during 1986.”).
174
George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
175
Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645 (1985).
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been all in favor of those expansions. 176 Within a few years, Mosk was joining
majorities on his Court in declining to expand tort liability any further. 177
There undoubtedly were other forces at work in halting the expansion
of tort liability. Much of the tort expansion “agenda” had been achieved
already.178 And the conservative revolution that began with the election of
President Ronald Reagan in 1980 then spread to the states, where it resulted
in the election or appointment of judges who, at the least, did not favor any
further expansion of liability.179 The long-tail liabilities that had materialized
in the decade prior to these lawyers’ ascension to the bench had to have been
a major reason for these new judges’ stance. In any event, whatever combined
set of factors halted the expansion of tort liability, the liability and insurance
crisis of 1986–86 almost certainly explains why the expansion of tort liability
halted exactly when it did. For more than three decades since then, there has
been no important expansion in tort liability doctrine.
In light of this altered judicial attitude toward the expansion of tort
liability, the courts’ continued willingness to make coverage-favoring
decisions in insurance disputes for the next couple decades may seem to call
out for explanation. In fact, the explanation is pretty clear and there was no
inconstancy in this willingness. The courts in most of these subsequent
coverage cases were interpreting and applying CGL insurance policies that
had been sold in the past, and sometimes the distant past. There was nothing
inconsistent about interpreting an older insurance policy in favor of coverage
of a liability that the courts were now declining to expand, if the liability had
in fact been imposed on a policyholder, just as the courts were continuing to
impose tort liabilities they had already created. Courts were merely declining
to expand liability any further. Similarly, the courts could continue to
interpret CGL policies issued prior to 1986 in accordance with the thendeveloping case law governing these policies, but also interpret the new
occurrence policies containing absolute pollution exclusions and new claimsmade policies in accordance with their new, coverage-restricting provisions.
There was no inconstancy in this stance.

See Priest, supra note 174, at 470–83, 512–18 (discussing Fleming James’s and William
Prosser’s approaches to tort liability expansion).
177
See, e.g., Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247, 254–56 (Cal. 1985) (limiting
the scope of market-share liability); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988)
(holding that negligence, not strict liability, governs prescription drug cases); Anderson v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 561–63 (Cal. 1991) (Mosk, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (concurring in an opinion rejecting hindsight analysis in failureto-warn cases).
178
See Schwartz, supra note 168, at 683–84 (offering an agenda-completion explanation).
179
See id. at 686–87 (discussing the impact of Governor Reagan’s judicial appointments on
the apparent shift in direction of California’s tort policy).
176
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D. The First Legislated Tort Law
Before there was long-tail liability, tort law governing liability for
accidental bodily injury and property damage was almost entirely common
law.180 Tort doctrine was the province of the courts. But because of long-tail
liability and its impact on liability insurance, tort reform statutes modifying
the common law were enacted, and tort law became the joint province of the
courts and legislatures. The centuries-long allocation of exclusive tort lawmaking responsibility to the courts became a thing of the past.
1. Medical malpractice reform
The first moves in that direction came in the mid-1970s, when there
was a medical malpractice liability insurance “crisis” that foreshadowed the
broader crisis that came ten years later. Medical malpractice sometimes
involves long-tail liability, because harm caused by malpractice may occur
during one year without manifesting itself until years later. In addition,
statutes of limitation traditionally did not begin to run until an injured child
reached the age of majority. Even if an injury to a child had been discovered
around the time it occurred, it could be many years before a suit alleging
liability for that injury was brought and resolved. 181
Because medical malpractice coverage was occurrence-based, longtail claims posed the same problems for malpractice insurers that they later
posed for CGL insurers. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, rates of suit
increased, and with that came in increase in long-tail claims.182 Premiums for
medical malpractice accordingly increased steeply, at just the point in the
insurance cycle that premium rates probably would have markedly increased
anyway (though probably to a lesser extent). Medical malpractice liability
insurers then proposed shifting from occurrence to claims-made coverage, a

180

There are only two exceptions of any significance, and these expanded liability rather
than restricting it, as did all the tort reform statutes of the late twentieth century. The first
exception was the adoption of the Employers Liability Act in the late nineteenth century,
which limited the scope of employers’ defenses in negligence actions brought by their
employees. Richard D. Epstein, The Historical Origin and Economic Structure of Workers’
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 778–79, 779 n.10 (1982). The second exception was
the widespread adoption of comparative negligence by statute in the 1970s. VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ & EVELYN F. ROWE, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE app. A, at 517–22 (5th ed. 2010).
181
See Kenneth S. Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD.
L. REV. 489, 502 (1977) (noting that the statute of limitations applicable to minors and people
with disabilities may not begin to run at the time of initial injury).
182
See Abraham, supra note 142, at 490 n.3 (noting an increase in the frequency of medical
malpractice claims against St. Paul physicians between 1968 and 1974).
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move that alarmed physicians.183 Some insurance commissioners refused to
approve the proposed shift, and some insurers withdrew altogether from
selling malpractice insurance in these states. Physicians faced the prospect of
having no malpractice insurance at all. 184
Physicians’ concerns naturally spilled over into public controversy in
many states. A “crisis” was declared to be in process, and both physicians’
representatives and medical malpractice insurers descended on state
legislatures seeking relief.
Legislatures enacted a number of significant
insurance reforms, including authorizing the establishment of physicianowned mutual liability insurance companies to substitute for or compete with
commercial malpractice insurers. 185 Most of these “bedpan mutuals” are still
operating in many states. Ironically, most sell claims-made coverage.186
More significantly, state legislatures enacted reforms of tort liability
that broke the historical pattern of leaving control of tort law doctrine to the
courts. The principal and most frequently adopted reform was to adopt a cap
or ceiling on the amount of pain and suffering damages that could be awarded
in a medical malpractice case. California’s MICRA statute, which applied a
$250,000 ceiling that was not indexed to inflation, is one of the most
discussed such measures.187 But there were others, including reversing or
limiting the collateral source rule and limiting the amount of attorneys’
contingent fees.188 Some of the statutory ceilings on pain and suffering
damages eventually were held to violate state constitutional provisions, but
most survive to this day.189

183

See James R. Posner, Trends in Medical Malpractice Insurance, 1970-1985, 49 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 44–45 (1986) (discussing physicians’ initial apprehensions regarding
claims-made insurance).
184
See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 108 (1985) (discussing how the denial of proposed rate increases and disapproval of
the claims-made form led to insurers withdrawing from the market).
185
See id. at 109–10 (noting that there has been “spectacular growth” in physician-owned
mutuals and reciprocals since 1975); Posner, supra note 183, at 39–40 (discussing the relative
success of physician and medical society sponsored malpractice insurers in the 1970s and 80s).
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Susan Dentzer & Doug Tsuruoka, Malpractice Insurers Are Ill, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 29,
1985, at 58.
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CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2021).
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See Prentiss E. Fagles, Betsy I. Carter, James A. Davids, Neal E. Tackabery & Clay B.
Tousey, Jr., An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis,
1975 DUKE L.J. 1417, 1446–50 (describing legislative reforms which have made “evidence
of collateral payments admissible at trial or require a reduction in damages by the amount of
such payments” and reforms which have limited the portion of recovery to which attorneys
are entitled).
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See, e.g., Yates v. Pollock, 239 Cal. Rptr. 383, 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding the
constitutionality of California’s cap on damages); Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v.
Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 222–23 (Ga. 2010) (holding Georgia’s cap unconstitutional).
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Medical malpractice insurance is now predominantly written on a
claims-made basis. Physicians bear much more of the risk of a long-term
change in the liability climate than they did under occurrence policies, and
must buy malpractice liability insurance even after they retire, because their
prior claims-made policies will not cover claims made after the expiration of
the policy. Notably, physicians refer to this as “buying the tail,” and typically
do so by obtaining a single claims-made policy for a sizable sum. 190 One of
the costs of retirement, or of ceasing to practice medicine, is the cost of
buying the tail – something that would have been completely unnecessary in
the old world of occurrence-based coverage.
2. Generally-applicable tort reform
When the crisis of the mid-1980s struck, the medical malpractice
reforms of the prior decade were a ready template for more broadlyapplicable reforms. Though from the present standpoint the enactment of tort
reform legislation seems unremarkable, at that point it was historically
unprecedented. Legislatures in nearly every state enacted the first tort-reform
statutes of general application they had ever adopted. 191 Tort law became, for
the first time, a mix of common law and legislation.
The most common generally-applicable reforms, as they had been a
decade earlier in connection with medical malpractice alone, were to place
ceilings on pain and suffering damages and to modify the collateral source
rule.192 Another significant measure was limitation of joint and several
liability, often to preclude full liability on the part of one co-defendant.193
This was designed at least in part to protect municipalities, which argued that
they were sometimes joined as defendants in serious-injury auto accident
cases in which a driver-defendant was largely responsible for an accident but
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See, e.g., Daniel M. Bernick, How Physician Practices Should Handle Malpractice Tail,
PHYSICIANS NEWS DIG., https://physiciansnews.com/2013/04/08/how-physician-practicesshould-handle-malpractice-tail/ [https://perma.cc/8HEU-6GXW] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021)
(describing the process of “buying the tail” and the potentially “huge” cost).
191
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the Races”: The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 207, 210
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had purchased only the mandatory minimum amount of liability insurance,
which was inadequate to cover the full amount of the plaintiff’s losses.194
Three points are noteworthy about these legislated tort reforms. First,
for the most part, the reforms did not address whether or when a defendant is
liable in tort. They left the standard of care and rules governing causation
untouched. Rather, directly or indirectly, the reforms all addressed the
amount of damages an otherwise-liable defendant was obligated to pay. 195
The main reason for the focus on damages, I think, is that political realities
made damages reform more feasible than liability reform. In modifying the
law of damages, there would be no headlines that an injured person’s right to
bring a lawsuit was being eliminated. Lawyers may understand that $250,000
or $500,000 is not a lot of money to award a seriously injured individual for
pain and suffering, but headlines do not capture that understanding.
In addition, restricting damages may have an indirect effect on the
incidence of liability itself, by depressing the number of long-shot lawsuits
that are brought. It may make sense for a plaintiff’s attorney to take a case
that has no ceiling on what may be recovered, even if the odds of getting any
recovery are small. Some long-shot cases, however, are not worth bringing at
all if they are going to be subject to a statutory ceiling on the amount of pain
and suffering damages that can be recovered in the case. Finally, for liability
insurers, the incidence of liability is far more predictable than the severity of
loss. And what matters for insurers is predictability. Various sorts of limits
on damages rendered liability insurers’ severity of exposure more
predictable, and that is what mattered for them.
A second noteworthy point is that, for the most part, the particular
reforms that were enacted were not responsive to and did not address the
underlying factors that made reform attractive. Long-tail liability had
rendered the insurance markets unstable, but none of the major reforms
addressed long-tail liability. A few minor reforms, such as the enactment of
statutes of repose applicable to medical malpractice and products liability,
did just that.196 These imposed absolute periods of limitation on the length of
See 2 REPORTERS’ STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 136–38
(AM. L. INST. 1991) (“Then the deep-pocket defendants ultimately pay a large percentage of
any substantial judgement entered in favor of the plaintiff, regardless of relative fault among
the injurers.”).
195
See MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN, MICHAEL D. GREEN & MARK A. GEISTFELD,
TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 824 (10th ed. 2016) (discussing
changes in damages and insurance rates); ABRAHAM, supra note 48, at 284 (describing
reforms which addressed–and sometimes limited–damages that could be recovered).
196
See, e.g., General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 3(3), 108
Stat. 1552 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101) (adopting an eighteen-year limitation period for
general aviation aircraft); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 4 (West 2021) (prescribing
both a three-year statute of limitations and a seven-year statute of repose for medical
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time after medical treatment was delivered or a product was sold available to
bring suit. But reforms such as ceilings on pain and suffering damages,
although they applied in both short-tail and long-tail cases, did not address
the problems that are distinctive to long-tail cases.
Part of the explanation for this disconnect is that the reforms were
enacted in the heat of the moment, before there had been time to analyze what
was really going on. The other part of the explanation, however, is simply
that the insurance industry and defense-oriented interest groups used the
sense of urgency that the liability and insurance crisis created in order to
obtain tort reforms that favored their interests, regardless of the reforms’
connection to the causes of the crisis. Third, and in historical terms most
importantly, the entry of the legislatures into the tort reform arena in the late
1980s not only changed the character of the common law of torts. From then
on, that genie was out of the bottle. Additional legislated tort reform became
an ever-present possibility, occupying the energies of interest groups, the
time of legislatures, figuring in judicial elections, and even in the 2004
election for President of the United States. 197 The mixture of common law
and legislation that the law of torts became beginning in the late 1980s could
at any point in the future easily become even more legislated and even less
judge-made. That is also the legacy of long-tail liability.
E. The Long Reach of the Long Tail: Ripples Effects Overseas
Like any significant sector of our economy, the U.S. insurance
markets are globally connected in many ways. As long-tail litigation
proceeded over time, the interaction of tort law and insurance naturally had
effects that reached beyond the border. Two of the most important such
effects involved the changes at Lloyd’s of London generated by U.S. longtail liabilities, and the establishment of two Bermuda-based liability insurers
to serve as an alternative to the standard U.S. CGL insurance market.
1. The troubles at Lloyd’s
As we saw earlier, Lloyd’s began marketing occurrence-based CGL
insurance in the U.S. in the 1950s. Even before then, Lloyd’s had sold
accident-based CGL policies to U.S. policyholders. In my experience, a
substantial percentage of Lloyd’s policies provided excess coverage,
beginning with the first layer above a primary policy or a significant selfmalpractice torts, regardless of the age at which the harm was incurred); 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–
16(a)(2) (adopting a thirty-six-month statute of limitations beginning at onset of the symptom
caused by the faulty vaccine, regardless of the age of the patient).
197
THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 104.
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insured retention—a layer of self-insurance that functioned much like a
deductible. By the 1980s, in many significant claims for coverage of long-tail
bodily injury or environmental cleanup coverage, Lloyd’s was likely to have
provided at least as much coverage to the policyholder as any other insurer.
Lloyd’s operated under a unique, and it turned out, antiquated,
financial structure. Lloyd’s itself was, and is, simply an insurance exchange.
“Syndicates” within Lloyd’s actually issued policies, and the syndicates were
not corporations with limited liability. Rather, the bearers of risk under
policies issued by Lloyd’s “syndicates” were individuals, or “Names,” whose
entire wealth (by virtue of their arrangement with a syndicate) stood behind
any syndicate in which they invested and were therefore potentially at risk. 198
Three years after a policy was issued, any remaining liability covered by a
policy was reinsured within Lloyd’s itself by other syndicates that also had
the entire wealth of individual Names standing behind them. This was
referred to as “reinsurance-to-close,” that is, reinsurance effective until the
policies were ultimately closed. 199
In theory, individual Names could be called upon to supply additional
capital to syndicates in which they had invested, up to the point at which the
Names themselves had no remaining assets.200 But until the 1980s, this rarely
occurred because the syndicates were profitable. With the coming of longtail insurance coverage litigation, however, Lloyd’s syndicates saw massive
amounts of capital being paid, and at risk of being paid, to U.S.
policyholders.201 Over the twenty-five year period ending in 1987, Lloyd’s
profits were approximately £4 billion. Over the next five years, losses were
£8 billion.202 The personal assets of thousands of Lloyd’s Names—many of
them prominent people in the United Kingdom—were in jeopardy.
Lloyd’s then saved itself from ruin. It established and funded a
separate entity, named “Equitas,” to be the repository of its syndicates’
liability under CGL policies issued prior to 1992.203 Establishing such an
entity, of course, could not unilaterally limit or foreclose a policyholder’s rights
against a syndicate that had sold them coverage. But in 2006, Warren Buffett’s
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company, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., reinsured all of Equitas’s liabilities, and the
Names were effectively insulated from any personal liability.204
At the same time, Lloyd’s modified its centuries-old financial
structure. Going forward, syndicates were to be corporate entities with
limited liability, and there would be no Names. Individuals could buy stock
in syndicates, but their liability would be limited in same manner as any
shareholder’s liability.
One of the ways that Equitas remained solvent was by engaging in a
prolonged and hard-nosed program of commuting its liabilities. After this
program took effect, policyholders negotiating with Lloyd’s over their longtail coverage claims encountered two obstacles. First, in order to preserve its
funds over the long period over which it would be exposed to liability,
Equitas “reserved” a certain amount of money for any given claim or set of
claims by a particular policyholder, and was usually able to credibly assert
that this (undisclosed) reserve was the maximum sum that Equitas could pay
to settle a claim. Policyholders understood that, because Equitas had no
capital coming in from the sale of new policies, and because of the internal
bureaucratic difficulty of reversing a reserving decision, for practical
purposes the undisclosed reserve, whatever it was, served as a ceiling on the
amount that Equitas could pay to settle a claim. Negotiations took place in
the shadow of this constraint, in my experience, to some extent to the
disadvantage of policyholders.
Second, Equitas’s strongly held negotiating position was that it would
not enter into settlements that preserved any coverage in place. Equitas was
determined to close out its liabilities, and not to pay a policyholder a large
sum now but still to be on the hook in the future for other, as-yet unmade
long-tail coverage claims under existing Lloyd’s policies. Consequently,
settlements had to involve full releases of all of the policyholder’s rights
under its Lloyd’s policies. These were referred to as full “buybacks” or
“global settlements” of coverage. 205
Many, perhaps most, policyholders whose long-tail coverage claims
had not yet been resolved by 1996 settled with Equitas on this basis. 206 But
the full buybacks that Equitas effectively required, and which were often then
demanded not only by Equitas but also by other settling insurers, created an
important new issue down the line. When a policyholder had settled with an
insurer using a full buyback, the significance of that settlement for the
policyholders’ other, non-settling insurers created a complex question: If the
policyholder later tried a coverage case against a non-settling insurer over a
204
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discrete liability or set of liabilities, as was often the case, to what extent was
that insurer entitled to an offset on account of the fact that the full buyback
settlement with Lloyd’s had paid the policyholder something, but not
everything, for that discrete liability?207 The policyholder’s current judgment
against the insurer in question was for apples (a discrete liability or set of
liabilities), whereas the settlement with Lloyd’s was for fruit salad that
included, but was not limited to, apples. More than thirty years after the
advent of long-tail insurance coverage litigation, that and related issues are
still being addressed, often through the making of new law.208
2. Bermuda insurance
In the midst of the crisis of 1985 and 1986, major policyholders had
concerns about obtaining sufficient excess liability insurance, because of the
reduced capacity of the U.S. and Lloyd’s markets. Large entities can
effectively self-insure against a steady stream of comparatively small
liabilities. A predictable number of judgments or settlements in excess of a
million dollars, with a larger number in smaller amounts, can easily be
handled without the need for liability insurance, and certainly without excess
liability insurance. What the companies needed from liability insurance was
protection against major or catastrophic liability, whether from a single
incident or from an unexpectedly severe series of individual incidents. 209
After some development, the largest U.S. insurance broker, Marsh &
McLennan, with the assistance of the J.P. Morgan Guaranty Bank, devised a
plan to establish in Bermuda a high-level excess insurance company to
provide Marsh’s corporate clients a stable source of such coverage. The new
insurance company established in late 1985 to provide such coverage was
ACE Insurance Company Ltd. 210 Six months later a second company that
would provide lower-level excess coverage, XL Insurance Ltd., was also
established in Bermuda.211 The founders of this approach wanted to ensure that
the coverage offered by ACE and XL both would be stable, and not subject to
what they knew insurers considered to be the extreme pro-policyholder stance
that many U.S. courts were taking in long-tail coverage cases.
207
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The whole point was to develop a policy that was not exposed to these
vulnerabilities, but that would nonetheless be attractive to major U.S.
policyholders seeking excess liability insurance. To achieve this purpose, the
Bermuda insurers included four new features of their policies that
distinguished them from the conventional U.S. CGL insurance policies that
were vulnerable to long-tail liability in the ways that had been revealed in the
preceding years.
a. An occurrence-reported trigger and a batch clause
The trigger of coverage under Bermuda policies is an occurrence that
is reported during the policy period and took place after any earlier retroactive
date specified in the policy. 212 These policies contain a standard exclusion for
expected or intended harm, but contain an exception to the exclusion for harm
that is “different in kind or greater in order of magnitude” than was expected
and intended. And the policies permit the policyholder to give notice of an
occurrence that may give rise in the future to a batch of claims or suits.213
This hybrid of occurrence and claims-made policies was designed to
suit the needs of the corporate policyholders for whom Bermuda policies
originally were offered. Auto makers and drug companies often encounter a
series of separate claims arising out of the same alleged designed defect in an
auto model, or the same failure to warn of a side effect associated with a
particular drug.214 If injuries associated with these situations start to be
reported to such companies, then they often expect such injuries to continue
to occur in the future, and thus during subsequent policy periods. Yet under
conventional CGL occurrence policies, these future injuries could be
considered expected and therefore excluded. And under conventional claimsmade policies, the insurer could simply include a targeted exclusion in future
policies and therefore avoid covering them.
The combined effect of the Bermuda provisions, in contrast, is that
once a policyholder experiences, or expects to experience, a spike in claims
or suits arising out of the same general cause, it can declare a batchoccurrence, and secure coverage of liability for claims or suits falling into
212
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that category even if they involve bodily injury or property damage that has
not yet occurred, and even if claims or suits alleging such liability have not
yet been made or brought.215 For insurers, the occurrence-reported feature of
Bermuda policies has one of the advantages of claims-made coverage: it
prevents the stacking, or the cumulation of coverage under multiple policies.
Only one year of coverage is ever available for liability arising out of a given
batch occurrence. The advantage for policyholders, on the other hand, is that
they can choose which single policy year on which to rely for coverage and be
assured that future claims falling into a batch declared that year will be covered.
b. An arbitration requirement
The policies require that disputes be arbitrated in London under the
rules of the English Arbitration Act of 1996.216 Bermuda policy arbitrations
are confidential. As a consequence, decisions by one tribunal have no
precedential effect in any other matter. 217 And the arbitrations are designed
to be streamlined proceedings. Direct testimony usually is presented in
written form. Hearings involve cross-examination plus extended closing
statements by counsel—sometimes (in my experience) lasting a full day or
more.218 Finally, for the Bermuda insurers, arbitration has the great advantage
of not being subject to decision by U.S. judges and juries, and the perceived
vicissitudes of the U.S. litigation environment.
c. New York law applies
Bermuda policies provide that disputes under the policy are governed
by New York law.219 The great advantage of this choice of law was that
arbitrators could look to the law of a single state for guidance and would not
have to contend with conflicting choice of law arguments made by the parties.
At the time the first Bermuda policies were drafted, New York, while not
ultraconservative or decidedly insurer-oriented, had not been the source of
any of the insurance policy interpretations that insurers regarded as being
highly result-oriented and policyholder-favoring. New York had been more
nearly neutral on that scale, and pro-insurer in regard to the meaning of the
Some versions of the Bermuda policy refer to this as an “integrated” occurrence. DAVID
SCOREY ET AL., supra note 213, at 110–18.
216
Id. at 24.
217
See RICHARD JACOBS ET AL., supra note 213, at 290 (describing confidentiality
requirements in Bermuda Form arbitration). The linkage of arbitration with confidentiality
means that there is no precedent-setting through arbitral decisions. Kenneth S. Abraham &
J.W. Montgomery, III, The Lawlessness of Arbitration, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 355, 360 (2003).
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qualified pollution exclusion. 220 So the Bermuda insurers predicted
(accurately, as it turned out) that as law governing other issues developed, the
New York courts would maintain that pattern.
d. No contra proferentem or extrinsic evidence
In another reaction to the pro-coverage judicial decisions of the early
1980s, Bermuda policies provide that they are to be construed “in an
evenhanded fashion,” and even where policy language is ambiguous, without
any “presumption or arbitrary interpretation in favor of either the Insured or
the Insurer,” “without regard to authorship of the language,” and “without
reference to parol or other reference extrinsic evidence.” Rather, construction
is to occur “in the manner most consistent with the relevant provisions” of
the policy.221 This left Bermuda policyholders without a major advantage that
they had under U.S. CGL policies—the ability to make use of the doctrine
that ambiguous policy language is construed against the drafter, and therefore
in favor of coverage, by virtue of the contra proferentem (“against the
drafter”) principle.
This set-up had obvious advantages for the Bermuda insurers, but it
also rendered arbitrations more challenging in one way. One of the great
advantages of contra proferentem is that it is a tie-breaker when extrinsic
evidence does not dictate the meaning of an ambiguous policy provision and
there is therefore no single correct interpretation of the language. 222 With this
tie-breaker removed, arbitrators sometimes are left to struggle without much
internal guidance from the complex policy language regarding how to resolve
the particular dispute at hand. 223
Bermuda policies have come to be important tools for major
corporations seeking insurance coverage of liabilities of major magnitude.
Other offshore insurers now sometimes sell coverage on the Bermuda form,
and the two original Bermuda insurers have gone on to have great success.
ACE branched into the U.S. market for conventional insurance, first by
purchasing CIGNA, and then recently by acquiring Chubb, a major player in
220
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both commercial and personal lines insurance in the U.S.224 XL is about to
be acquired by AXA, a European insurer, and when that is accomplished,
AXA will become the one of the world’s largest insurance companies.225
All this came about because of the development of a liability
insurance policy whose terms would appear utterly bizarre to anyone not
familiar with the reasons the policy came into being: the policies are issued
in Bermuda to U.S. policyholders, but require the specific application of New
York law; disputes about New York law nevertheless must be resolved in
arbitration, not in New York or even in the United States, but in London; and
the policies set aside the first rule of insurance law: that ambiguous insurance
policy language is to be interpreted in favor of coverage. The Bermuda
policies are a graphic example of the tortuous path that long-tail liability has
caused liability insurance to travel.
F. Increased Corporate Self-Insurance
There has been a decided increase in the percentage of civil liability
costs that are self-insured by commercial entities since the 1970s. 226
Although data on the practice is scant, one study found that the percentage of
commercial lines tort costs that are self-insured went from 6% in 1973, to
25.5% in 1985, to 44.4% in 2010.227 Most of this self-insurance is likely to
be at low levels of liability and to function as a self-insured retention, or SIR,
which is the economic equivalent of a deductible.
This trend toward self-insurance signifies that corporate entities have
chosen to bear an increasing percentage of small liability risk themselves
rather than insuring against this risk. For sizable corporations, CGL insurance
has become increasingly important as a tool used mainly to protect against
large, potentially catastrophic liabilities. Long-tail liability has to be
considered at least partly responsible for this increase in self-insuring because
long-tail liability so influenced modification of liability insurance policies to
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the point at which they have become a less and less attractive means of
insuring against routine liability.
Self-insuring against routine liabilities had always made more
economic sense than corporate policyholders seemed to have recognized.
This is because the larger the entity, the more predictable its stream of
comparatively small liabilities, and the more sense it makes for the entity to
serve, in effect, as its own insurer of these highly predictable liabilities.
Nonetheless, less such self-insuring than might have been expected seems to
have occurred. Once litigation over long-tail coverage claims became
commonplace, however, policyholders may have realized that they might
well face more litigation over coverage of even routine liabilities than they
had in the past. The perceived balance between the costs and benefits of selfinsuring may then have shifted, given that recovering coverage of low-level
liabilities could no longer be seen as essentially costless.
In fact, it is not at all clear why the largest corporations purchase any
liability insurance at all, given that (in my experience) they purchase and have
always purchased less than $1 billion per year of CGL insurance coverage.
Just to take an example, General Electric Company had approximately $120
billion in revenue in 2017.228 An extraordinary liability of as much as $500
million would constitute less than one-half of one percent of that revenue.
Why insure any of this potential liability? It may be that the cost of
purchasing insurance against such a liability, and the cost of litigating with
dozens of insurers over coverage of it, is worth the smoothing of GE’s
balance sheet that having insurance against such a liability provides. 229
Otherwise GE could have to post on its balance sheet a $500 million liability
that would affect its earnings in a particular quarter of its fiscal year. The
securities markets might overreact; the availability of insurance cushions
against that reaction. In addition, as Tom Baker and Sean Griffith have
suggested, corporate managers probably have concentrated investments in
the company for which they work, and therefore stand to benefit more from
the risk-spreading accomplished by insurance than the company’s
shareholders, whose investment are likely to be more diversified.230 Perhaps
that also explains the purchase of liability insurance by major U.S.
corporations, since the managers influence what insurance is purchased.
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General Electric Co. Annual Income Statement, MARKETWATCH, https://www.market
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Confirmation of the notion that the purchase of liability insurance by
these entities is not necessarily economically rational came in 2010, after the
Deepwater Horizon blowout and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. BP, which
leased the rig and bore the lion’s share of financial responsibility for the
damage caused by the spill, apparently had made a considered decision not
to carry any insurance against liability arising out of its drilling activities. 231
Yet, after paying upwards of $20 billion for that damage, BP continued as a
going, and arguably financially healthy, concern. 232 It seems highly likely
that part of BPs decision can be ascribed to the economic considerations I
have just described. BP is just an extreme example of the increased amount
of self-insuring in which large corporate entities began to engage after longtail liability came to have such a far-reaching influence on the nature and
availability of general liability insurance.
CONCLUSION
During the last fifty years, long-tail liability has produced farreaching and, in many respects, fundamental changes in tort and insurance
law. The consequences of those legal changes were felt in many ways, as law
practice, the insurance markets, and insurance institutions adjusted to deal
with the changes. To a large extent, long-tail liabilities were the legacy of
industrial activity that occurred during the first half of the twentieth century,
and of the major chemical and pharmaceutical advances of the middle of that
century. Both developments caused latent bodily injury, property damage,
and environmental pollution that eventually led to new forms of liability, new
insurance law, and new forms of liability insurance. It took half a century for
this to occur because it took place through common law litigation in which
each state has its own law.
But has long-tail liability seen its heyday? It is the very nature of longtail liability not to herald its arrival. Rather, when long-latent harm appears,
it tells us that we have until now failed to recognize that harms that were
caused in the distant past and are only now manifesting themselves. The
harms may be physical, but they may also be emotional or economic.
231
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Whether harms are now occurring out of sight that will only be recognized
decades from now is impossible to say. And, if long-tail harms do eventually
materialize, it is impossible to say for certain whether the new legal doctrines
that were created to deal with twentieth-century long-tail harms will be
adequate for dealing with the kinds of harms that occur as a result of twentyfirst century activities.
For example, gene therapy and the use of biologics are rapidly
becoming a substitute for the use of chemotherapy to treat various forms of
cancer. Although pre-clinical testing is designed to detect the adverse side
effects of such new therapies, it is in the nature of long-tail harm that shortterm testing often cannot detect the risk that it will occur. We cannot very
well spend twenty or thirty years waiting around to see whether a new therapy
or drug that promises to save life may lead in the long run to the occurrence
of harm in a small fraction of those who would benefit from the new therapy
or drug. Short-term animal studies sometimes are directed at predicting longterm human effects, but they cannot be completely successful in doing so. As
the use of new gene and other molecular-level therapies accelerates, whether
long-tail harm will accompany them remains an open question. I am not at
all sure that current tort law is adequate to the task of dealing with potential
liability for such harm, when and if it occurs. To give just one example,
doctrines that could be applied to potential liability in situations in which a
therapy saves a life but causes long-term, unexpected harm are
underdeveloped. What the long-tail liability revolution has definitely taught
us, however, is that creating new common law to deal with a fundamentally
new problem is unlikely to take place quickly.
Similarly, it is unclear whether there will be an epidemic of long-tail
cyber-harm – economic, dignitary, emotional, or physical -- that materializes
in the future. There are weekly news reports that major companies have
recently discovered that their digital records were hacked at some point in the
past, with potential credit, privacy, and identity-theft harms resulting. We do
not know how much harm hacking that has already occurred, or will occur in
the future, has already caused or will cause in the future. Hacking not only
harms those whose privacy is compromised but may also cause other effects
such as enabling interference with elections, utility grids, self-driving cars,
and any number of further functions that become automated in ways that are
both beneficial and risky. And cyber-insurance, a growing phenomenon in
the insurance market, will be called upon for coverage.
Yet current doctrines governing long-term cyber-related harm, and
insurance against liability for such harm, also are underdeveloped. The courts
will have to work out the contours of liability for the new forms of liability
and of insurance coverage for that liability. The decentralized system that
produces the common law of civil liability and insurance is likely to be at
least one source of the law governing these new issues. Certainly, the current
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national political climate gives us no reason to think that the legislation, or
regulation so characteristic of the administrative state will be able to take over
handling these new liability and compensation problems. Yet, as we have
seen, although the common law system may be capable of coping with these
issues, it is likely to take a long time to do so.
In short, the rise of long-tail liability was the most significant
influence on the changes that have taken place in tort and insurance law in
the last fifty years. This form of liability is of singular importance for that
reason alone. But it may be important as time goes on as well. Only the future
will tell us whether this form of liability will exert the same kind of influence
on legal development when new forms of long-tail harm arise and pose
challenges for the doctrinal current structure of tort and insurance law.

